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Assuming the jurors followed the court’s instructions, the jury’s silence as to the aggravated robbery count, coupled with its conviction on theft of a means of transportation, demonstrates, at most, that the jury could not reach agreement on the greater charge after a “full and careful consideration of the evidence” and “reasonable effort

how can he truly look at the victim’s family or at you and say he is truly remorseful?” ¶78 To determine if prosecutorial misconduct exists, we examine two factors: “(1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 60

¶ 22 & n.6, & n.6 (2006).

¶ 68 , (jury is presumed to follow court’s instructions).

The jury was properly instructed, and we presume the jury followed its instructions to “decide each count separately on the evidence with the law applicable to it.” ¶ 68 , (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).

derstand the evidence and apply the law.” Given these instructions, we evaluate Ovante’s claim presuming that the jury recognized that the lawyers’ statements were not evidence and that the jury sought to reach a “reasoned, moral judgment about which sentence [was] justified and appropriate.” ¶¶ 67–68, (holding that 11 jury instructions negated improper comments of prosecutor); ¶ 50, (holding that jury instructions cured th

¶10 We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instruction and determined the state had proven “the defendant failed to register with the sheriff within ten days after entering and remaining in Pima County.”

hing takes two forms: ‘(1) where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its [evidence] [and] (2) where the prosecutor suggests that 13 information not presented to the jury supports the [evidence].’” ¶ 62, ( ) (alterations in Newell).

The jury was instructed about its duty to determine the credibility of witnesses, and “[w]e presume that the jurors followed the court's instructions.” ¶ 68

conduct, we “consider two factors: (1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 60

In independent review, “we do not defer to the findings or decision of the jury, with respect to aggravation or mitigation, when determining the propriety of the death sentence.” ¶ 82, (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

We “do not defer to the findings or decision of the jury, with respect to aggravation or mitigation, when determin[ing] the propriety of the death sentence.” State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 405 ¶ 82, (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 68, (stating jurors are presumed to follow instructions).