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¶184 The jury instructions explicitly informed jurors they were “not limited to these proposed mitigating circumstances in considering the appropriate sentence” and they “may consider any mitigating evidence,” including “anything related to the defendant’s character, propensity, history or record, or circumstances of the offense.” ¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”); see also Boyde, 494 U.S. at 384 (stating “arguments of counsel generally carry less weig

¶33 “Prosecutorial vouching takes two forms: ‘(1) where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its [evidence] [and] (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the [evidence].’” (alterations in Newell) ().

¶ 27 (2006) ( ¶ 62 (2004)).

¶¶ 67–68 (2006) (holding that jury instructions stating that closing arguments are not evidence negated improper comments of prosecutor).

Miranda warnings include the right to presence of counsel, and if the individual who is interrogated asserts this right, “all questioning must cease until an attorney is present or the defendant reinitiates communication.” ¶ 24 (2006).

¶¶ 68–69 (2006) (Jurors are presumed to follow the given instructions.).

¶ 61 (2006) (citations omitted) (observing that “the trial court is in the best position to determine the effect of a prosecutor’s comments on a jury”).

And during preliminary and final instructions, the court reminded the jury that the “dog’s presence is not and should not be a reflection on the truthfulness or credibility of any testimony that is offered by the witness” and that the “presence of the dog should not influence [their] deliberations in any way.” (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).

¶ 68 (2006) (asserting the presumption that jurors follow court instructions "that anything said in closing arguments was not evidence").

and not for any other purpose.” “We presume jurors follow the court’s instructions,” and we will not reverse based on “vague references to other unproven crimes” with an appropriate limiting instruction

Because the court instructed the jury that “any sustained objection meant that the information must be disregarded,” ¶ 69 (2006), these comments did not affect the jury’s verdict, ¶ 77 (2018) (The presumption that the jury follows instruction “eradicates a slight possibility of any taint from vouching when the state follows up with an appropriate limiting comment”).

¶ 89 (2011) ( ¶ 68 (2006)) (concluding that any confusion caused by the prosecutor’s misstatement of law was cured by proper jury instructions).

¶ 68 (2006) (jurors presumed to follow court’s instructions).

G.A.’s testimony about her father’s life was very brief, and the jury was instructed not to “be influenced by sympathy or prejudice.” ¶ 69 (2006) (recognizing the presumption that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions).

¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).