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¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).

¶ 34 (2006) (noting that courts "may" review a suppression argument raised for the first time on appeal for fundamental error).

¶20 Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that counsel’s statements during their opening statements and closing arguments were “not evidence,” and “[w]e presume that the jurors follow[] the court’s instructions.” ¶ 68 (2006).

“Because the trial court is in the best position to determine the effect of a prosecutor’s comments on a jury, we will not disturb a trial court’s denial of a mistrial for prosecutorial [error] in the absence of a clear 6 STATE v. GILBERT Decision of the Court abuse of discretion.” ¶ 61 (2006).

¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court's instructions.”).

We review the court’s legal conclusions de novo, ¶ 27 (2006), and we must affirm the superior court if its ruling “was legally correct for any reason,”

It instructed the jury that Roberts was not responsible for Jane's death and “not to consider her death as any indication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” The instruction was clear, and “we presume jurors follow the court’s instructions.” ¶ 69 (2006).

the jurors that “[i]f an objection to a 9 STATE v. DANIEL Decision of the Court question [was] sustained, [they] must disregard the question and [they] must not guess what the answer to the question might have been.” Because we presume the jurors followed the court’s instructions, ¶ 69 (2006), we conclude the prosecutor’s questions did not contribute to the verdict.

¶ 68 (2006) (providing that appellate courts “presume that the jurors followed the [trial] court’s instructions”).

¶33 A superior court “is in the best position to determine the effect of a prosecutor’s comments on a jury.” ¶ 61 (2006).

¶ 68 (2006) ("We presume that the jurors followed the court's instructions.").

¶10 “Because the trial court is in the best position to determine the effect of a prosecutor’s comments on a jury, we will not disturb a trial court’s denial of a mistrial for prosecutorial [error] in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” ¶ 61 (2006).

¶ 54 (2006) (“In determining whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination, ‘implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretext[ual].’” (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995))).