Cited by

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (stating that a defendant claiming fundamental error “must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry 8 STATE v. BAKER Decision of the Court his burden”); ¶ 69 (2006) (“[W]e presume jurors follow the court’s instructions .

¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).

¶ 48 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (“The proper response to an improper prosecutorial comment is an objection, motion to strike, and a jury instruction to disregard the stricken comment.”); ¶ 69 (2006) (finding an instruction that the jury must disregard statements after a sustained objection curative even where the jury was not told to disregard the statements at the time of the objection and noting that juries are 24 STATE V. THOMP

¶ 68 (2006) ("We presume that the jurors followed the court's instructions.").

¶10 In determining whether a prosecutor’s closing argument was error, we consider “(1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 60 (2006).

¶ 68 (2006) (presuming that jurors follow jury instructions).

A Batson challenge is composed of three steps: (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) if such a showing is made, the prosecutor must provide a race-neutral reason for the strike; (3) if the prosecutor provides a facially neutral basis, the “court must determine whether ‘the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.’” ¶ 53 (2006) (citation omitted).

¶ 27 (2006) (citation omitted).

¶ 34 (2006) (reviewing for fundamental error a suppression argument first raised on appeal); -06 (1977) (waiving suppression issue when defendant neither joined codefendant’s motion nor raised the issue at trial).

“This third step is fact intensive and will turn on issues of credibility, which the trial court is in a better position to assess than is this Court.” ¶ 54 (2006).

¶7 A ruling on a motion to suppress will not be reversed absent “clear and manifest error.” ¶ 22 (2006).

¶21 “Prosecutorial vouching takes two forms: (1) where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its evidence and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the evidence.” ¶ 62 (2006) (quotation and alternations omitted).

¶ 13 (App. 2013); ¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).

The court instructed the jurors that anything said in closing arguments was not evidence and “[w]e presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.” ¶ 68 (2006).

be the one really making [the] decision.” He agreed with the State that he should not be empaneled on the jury because of this issue and expressed that he may become “frozen and unable to make that decision.” Later, Juror 14 spoke privately with the court and reiterated that he would have difficulty imposing a death sentence and would consider it a “last option.” –02 ¶¶ 55, 58 (2006) (affirming denial of Batson challenge where juror provided conflicting responses about the death penalty).

( ¶ 82 (2006)); see also Poyson III, 879 F.3d at 888.