Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930.
- State v. Campo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
- State of Arizona v. Edward Littleton McCauley Ariz. 2026
- State v. Serrano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
- State v. Serrano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
- State of Arizona v. Albert F. Vergara Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
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State of Arizona v. Albert F. Vergara
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
We review for an abuse of discretion the admissibility of evidence, and review alleged constitutional violations de novo
- State v. Piper Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
- State v. Piper Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
- Jacob Laurence v. Salt River Project Ariz. 2023
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Jacob Laurence v. Salt River Project
Ariz. 2023
Regardless, any departure from stare decisis “demands special justification.” Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 200 ¶ 37 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)); ¶ 22 (2011) (stating the Court will not overturn prior case law for “mere disagreement” but “will overturn long- standing precedent only for a compelling reason” ( ¶ 52 (2006))).
- State v. Preston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
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State v. Preston
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
¶ 40 (2006) (citation omitted).
- State v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
- State v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
- State v. Richardson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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State v. Richardson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶ 19 (2006); ¶ 27 (App. 2005).
- State of Arizona v. Allyn Akeem Smith 475 P.3d 558 Ariz. 2020
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State of Arizona v. Allyn Akeem Smith
475 P.3d 558
Ariz. 2020
STATE V. SMITH Opinion of the Court admission of evidence during the penalty phase for abuse of discretion and give “deference to a trial judge’s determination of whether rebuttal evidence offered during the penalty phase is ‘relevant’ within the meaning of the statute.” ¶ 87 (2019) (–57 ¶ 40 (2006)).
- State Ex Rel Adel v. Hon. Hannah jr/ashley Buckman 472 P.3d 1100 Ariz. 2020
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State Ex Rel Adel v. Hon. Hannah jr/ashley Buckman
472 P.3d 1100
Ariz. 2020
Because of this, the sentencing phase may consist of an “aggravation phase” (sometimes called the “eligibility phase”) and a “penalty phase.” § 13-752(C)–(D); ¶ 85 n.9 (2006) (Hurwitz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
- State v. Romero 463 P.3d 225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
- State v. Romero 463 P.3d 225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
- State of Arizona v. Alan Matthew Champagne 447 P.3d 297 Ariz. 2019
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State of Arizona v. Alan Matthew Champagne
447 P.3d 297
Ariz. 2019
Likewise, we review a trial court’s admission of evidence during the penalty phase for abuse of discretion, ¶ 8 (2012), giving “deference to a trial judge’s determination of whether rebuttal evidence offered during the penalty phase is ‘relevant’ within the meaning of the statute,” –57 ¶ 40 (2006).
- State v. White Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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State v. White
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
¶30 Because a double jeopardy violation constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, ¶ 21 (2006), we vacate White's conviction of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and the resulting sentence, see Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 21.
- State v. Wadi Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
- State v. Wadi Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
- State v. Dulin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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State v. Dulin
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Generally, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 30 (2006), but “we cannot require trial judges sua sponte to rule on issues not raised before them.”
- State v. Mullet Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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State v. Mullet
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 21 (2006); Powers, 200 Ariz. at 125, ¶ 5.
- State of Arizona v. Bryan Wayne Hulsey Ariz. 2018
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State of Arizona v. Bryan Wayne Hulsey
Ariz. 2018
§ 13-751(C); ¶ 40 (2006).
- State v. Candler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Candler
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 19 (2006) (jury may infer from the evidence that a defendant was aware of the substantial risk created by his conduct).
- State v. Spry Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Spry
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶8 “A person commits endangerment by recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death or physical injury.” ¶ 17 (2006) (quoting A.R.S.
- State v. Eagleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Eagleman
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 50 (2006) (the confrontation clause only applies to trials).
- State v. Lomeli Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Lomeli Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Connatser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Connatser
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 40 (2006); ¶ 9 (App. 2003).
- State of Arizona v. Aaron Brian Gunches 377 P.3d 993 Ariz. 2016
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State of Arizona v. Aaron Brian Gunches
377 P.3d 993
Ariz. 2016
‑59 ¶¶ 47-52, ‑42 (2006); see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (interpreting the Confrontation Clause).
- State of Arizona v. Samkeita Jahveh Jurden 373 P.3d 543 Ariz. 2016
- State of Arizona v. Samkeita Jahveh Jurden 373 P.3d 543 Ariz. 2016
- State v. Settle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Settle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016