Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378.

110 citing documents.

  • State v. Braxton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Braxton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Marques Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Marques Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Garcia Del Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Garcia Del Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    1 “Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence.” ¶ 28 (2006) (citation omitted).
  • State v. Briseno Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Briseno Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    is inadequate because it fails to consider the “cumulative impact” of consecutive sentences, thus denying him a “fundamental right.” After the State filed its response, and Briseno his reply, the superior court set an evidentiary hearing.
  • State v. Sprouse Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Sprouse Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Ali 895 N.W.2d 237 Minn. 2017
  • State v. Gulli 391 P.3d 1210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
  • State v. Gulli 391 P.3d 1210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
    ¶21 As Gulli acknowledges, ¶¶ 25, 51 , 388 (2006), that the defendant’s twenty consecutive ten-year prison sentences, imposed pursuant to §§ 13-705 and 13-3553(C) for the possession of child pornography, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
  • State v. Shreve Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Shreve Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State of Arizona v. Manuel Fernando Florez 384 P.3d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
  • State of Arizona v. Manuel Fernando Florez 384 P.3d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
    to a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that prohibits sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-21 (2003) (plurality opinion).
  • State v. Laird Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Laird Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    “[I]f the sentence for a single offense is not disproportionately long, it does not become so merely because it is consecutive to another sentence for a separate offense or because the consecutive sentences are lengthy in aggregate.” ¶ 28, quoted in Kasic, 228 Ariz. at 233, ¶ 24, 265 P.3d at 415.
  • State v. Coleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Coleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    This prohibition has been applied to lengthy prison sentences, but “noncapital sentences are subject only to a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that prohibits sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” ¶ 10 (2006) (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 23 (2003)).
  • State v. Lynam Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Lynam Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    The statutory scheme for this offense has been recognized as commanding that “the possession of each image of child pornography is a separate offense.” (emphasis added); see A.R.S.
  • State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶ 3 (2006); n.5, ¶ 6 (App. 2008) (Possession of child pornography is "defined in terms of the visual image itself rather than any specific media or physical object containing the image.").
  • State v. Villela Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Villela Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶ 28, (citations omitted).
  • State v. Brooks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Brooks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    The Eighth Amendment “’does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence’ but instead forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” ¶ 13 (2006) (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003)).
  • State v. Esposito Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Esposito Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    ¶20 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution “’does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence’ but instead forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” ¶ 13 (2006) (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003)).
  • State v. Doody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Doody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    A sentence that does not violate the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment does not become unconstitutional “merely because it is consecutive to another sentence for a separate offense or because the consecutive sentences are lengthy in aggregate.” ¶ 28
  • State v. Welch 340 P.3d 387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • State v. Welch 340 P.3d 387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
    When considering whether a sentence is excessive, a court “first determines if there is a threshold showing of gross disproportionality by comparing ‘the gravity of the offense [and] the hai’shness of the penalty.’ ” , quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 , 123 S.Ct.
  • State of Arizona v. Christian Paul Royalty 336 P.3d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • State of Arizona v. Christian Paul Royalty 336 P.3d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
    The pornography’s continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 929 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Unfortunately, the ‘victimization’ of the children involved does not end when the pornographer’s camera is put away.”); (child pornography victims harmed not only by production of images but also by invasion of privacy in others’ continued possession of such images).
  • State v. Gill 333 P.3d 36 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Gill 333 P.3d 36 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    ¶ 13, (noting that “courts must accord substantial deference to the legislature and its policy judgments” in analyzing sentencing statutes); (affirming that “statutory language is given its plain meaning unless impossible or
  • State v. Vidovic Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Vidovic Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    ¶15 The Eighth Amendment “does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but instead forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” ¶ 13, (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
  • State v. Dyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Dyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Juarez 837 N.W.2d 473 Minn. 2013
  • STATE OF ARIZONA v. STEVE FRANK McPHERSON 269 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • STATE OF ARIZONA v. STEVE FRANK McPHERSON 269 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
    ¶¶ 3, 18-20, 382-83 (2006) (Berger II).
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Noriki Kasic 265 P.3d 410 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Noriki Kasic 265 P.3d 410 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
    10 ¶24 As a general rule, we do not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in the proportionality inquiry, and Kasic has not convinced us that departure from the general rule would be appropriate in this case.