Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Tucker, 160 P.3d 177.

158 citing documents.

  • State v. Delahanty 250 P.3d 1131 Ariz. 2011
    State v. Tucker (“Tucker II”), P.3d 177 (2007).
  • State of Arizona v. Orleans P. Estrella Juan Carlos Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Orleans P. Estrella Juan Carlos Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    See State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, ¶ 46, (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion).
  • State v. Gallardo 242 P.3d 159 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Gallardo 242 P.3d 159 Ariz. 2010
    We have approved narrowing instructions for the “especially cruel” aggravating factor that require the jury to find that (1) “the victim was conscious during the mental anguish or physical pain” and (2) “the defendant knew or should have known that the victim would suffer.” ¶ 31, (citations omitted).
  • State v. Snelling 236 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Snelling 236 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2010
    § 13-752(E), (H), the facial vagueness of the (F)(6) aggravator “may be remedied with appropriate narrowing instructions,” ¶ 28
  • State v. Don Chappell 236 P.3d 1176 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Martin 235 P.3d 1045 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • State v. Martin 235 P.3d 1045 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    ¶ 61 , (testimony that is not admitted to prove its truth is not hearsay and does not violate the Confrontation Clause).
  • State v. Don Chappell 236 P.3d 1176 Ariz. 2010
    13 This vagueness, however, “may be remedied with appropriate narrowing instructions.” ¶ 28, -53 ¶¶ 109-14, -95 (2005).
  • State v. Womble 235 P.3d 244 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Womble 235 P.3d 244 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Lynch 234 P.3d 595 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Lynch 234 P.3d 595 Ariz. 2010
    See, -23 ¶¶ 96-120, -202 (2007); ¶¶ 96-98
  • In Re Thomas R. 233 P.3d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • In Re Thomas R. 233 P.3d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    -15, ¶ 52, 61-62 , -94 (2007).
  • State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
    We upheld a -11 ¶¶ 30-31, -90 (2007), and find no reason to depart from that decision now.
  • State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
    State v. Tucker (Tucker II), ¶¶ 70-73
  • State v. Cropper 225 P.3d 579 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Cropper 225 P.3d 579 Ariz. 2010
    Our cases make clear that an (F)(6) instruction is sufficient if it requires the state to establish that “‘the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain and the defendant knew or should have known that’ the victim would suffer.” -11 ¶¶ 31-33, -90 (2007) (alterations removed) ( n.18 ¶ 109, n.18 (2005)).
  • State v. Larson 214 P.3d 429 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • State v. Larson 214 P.3d 429 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • State v. Escobedo 213 P.3d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • State v. Escobedo 213 P.3d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
    C. ¶ 20 Third, the test for structural error includes as one factor that the error produce a trial that “cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for guilt or innocence.” ¶ 66 .
  • State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
    it is difficult to imagine a motive for the killings [of the children] unrelated to the murder of [Valerie].” State v. Tucker (Tucker II), ¶ 105, (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • State v. Speer 212 P.3d 787 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
    res the state to prove that mitigating circumstances do not warrant leniency; instead, as we noted in State v. Tucker (Tucker II), the Supreme Court held that so long as the state is required to prove the elements of the offense and aggravating circumstances, the state may place on the defendant “the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” ¶ 67, (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • State v. Speer 212 P.3d 787 Ariz. 2009
    ¶52 The (F)(3) aggravator has three components: (1) the “murderous act created a grave risk of death to” a third person; (2) defendant “knowingly created such a risk”; and (3) “there was a ‘real and substantial likelihood’ that the third person would be killed.” State v. Tucker (Tucker II), ¶ 21
  • State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
    Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990); Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 310, 896 P.2d at 850; State v. Tucker (Tucker II), P.3d 177 (2007).
  • State of Arizona v. Shawn De Nean Edmisten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State of Arizona v. Shawn De Nean Edmisten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Nichols 195 P.3d 207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
  • State v. Nichols 195 P.3d 207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
    “[EJvidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” , quoting Ariz. R. Evid.
  • State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
  • State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
    “[E]vidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” quoting Ariz. R. Evid.
  • State v. Wallace 191 P.3d 164 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Wallace 191 P.3d 164 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Armstrong 189 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Armstrong 189 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
    State v. Tucker (Tucker II), ¶ 74, cert.
  • State v. Boggs 185 P.3d 111 Ariz. 2008