Cited by

10 U. Abuse of Discretion Review for Jury’s Imposition of Death Sentence ¶223 Arizona law mandates that this Court review “all death sentences to determine whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in finding aggravating circumstances and imposing a sentence of death.” § 13-756(A); see State v. (Cory D.) Morris, ¶ 76 (2007).

¶ 46 (2007) (citations omitted).

We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, Bowen Prods., ¶ 9 (App. 2013), and will uphold it if there is “any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it,” ¶ 77 (2007) ().

Relevant photographs that are gruesome or inflammatory may be admissible unless they are “admitted for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury.” ¶ 70 (2007) (citation omitted).

§ 13-755(A); ¶¶ 75–76 (2007).

We consider whether “persistent and pervasive” error occurred and whether the “cumulative effect of the [errors] shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.” ¶ 67 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶75 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial error, a defendant must show “that the prosecutor’s [error] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 13 (2021) ( ¶ 46 (2007)).

at 163, ¶ 10 ( ¶ 12 (2018)); ¶ 47 (2007).

¶ 44 (2007) (errors not effecting the outcome are harmless); (applying harmless error in a family law case).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) (quotation and citation omitted).

¶ 44 (2007) (“An error is harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”) (cleaned up) ( ¶ 18 (2003)).

¶13 Turning to the inquiry here, “[t]o prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Comments in Rebuttal Closing Argument ¶33 “Prosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their arguments to the jury[.]” ¶ 51 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).

¶36 “Prosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their arguments to the jury” but may not “make insinuations that are not supported by the evidence.” ¶ 51 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Prosecutorial Error ¶16 Wade argues the State engaged in a pattern of error at trial, which deprived him of a fair trial and due process of law.1 ¶17 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial [error], a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s [error] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 58 (2007) (quotation omitted).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The defendant’s burden is to prove the misconduct was ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 465, ¶ 193 ( ¶ 46 (2007)).

¶31 “The corpus delicti doctrine ensures that a defendant’s conviction is not based upon an uncorroborated confession or incriminating statement.” ¶ 34 (2007) (italics added).

¶25 The corpus delicti rule prevents a conviction based solely on an individual’s “uncorroborated confession or incriminating statement[s].” ¶ 34 (2007) (citation omitted); ¶ 9 (2010).