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¶31 “The corpus delicti doctrine ensures that a defendant’s conviction is not based upon an uncorroborated confession or incriminating statement.” ¶ 34 (2007) (italics added).

¶25 The corpus delicti rule prevents a conviction based solely on an individual’s “uncorroborated confession or incriminating statement[s].” ¶ 34 (2007) (citation omitted); ¶ 9 (2010).

We review the admission of other act evidence for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 10 (App. 2013), and will uphold a decision if there is “any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.” ¶ 77 (2007) ().

We review “each instance of alleged misconduct, and the standard of review depends upon whether [the defendant] objected.” ¶47 (2007).

¶ 51 (2007) ( ¶ 59 (1998)).

Applying this standard of review, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 28 (App. 2012) ( ¶ 77 (2007)).

[he] cannot make arguments that appeal to the fears or passions of the jury.” ¶ 58 (2007).

¶30 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).

¶21 To establish prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show the misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” and prove the misconduct was “so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

“A finding of aggravating circumstances or the imposition of a death sentence is not an abuse of discretion if ‘there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 36 (2011) ( ¶ 77 (2007)).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

See, –88, ¶ 8 (2015); ¶ 9 (2010); ¶ 34 (2007).

to challenge the jury’s decision with regard to either the aggravating factors or the imposition of the death sentence.” ¶¶ 75–76 (2007); see also A.R.S.

We will affirm the jury’s finding of aggravating circumstances “if there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it,” ¶ 77 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), and uphold the jury’s imposition of the death sentence “so long as any reasonable jury could have concluded that the mitigation established by the defendant was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,” id.

“Even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, the judge’s instructions negated their effect.” ¶ 55 (2007).

¶ 35 (quoting State v. Morris , , ¶ 47, ).

¶ 71 n.8 (2007) (appellant cannot establish prejudice from exhibits never admitted into evidence).