Cited by

¶ 70, (noting that photographs of a victim may be introduced to, among other things, corroborate, illustrate, or explain testimony).24 ¶48 Further, Clary has not shown the photographs are so gruesome that their probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice u

To prevail on his claim, a defendant 8 STATE v. BROWN Decision of the Court must demonstrate that “the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted).

§ 13-756(A), we review the jury’s finding that a murder was especially cruel for abuse of discretion, ¶ 72, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, ¶ 81, and resolving all inferences against the defendant, Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 212 ¶ 87, 84 P.3d at 477.

In determining whether a trial court erred in admitting a photograph, we examine “’the photograph's relevance, its tendency to inflame the jury, and its probative 6 STATE v. MENDOZA-SARAVIA Decision of the Court valued compared to its potential to cause unfair prejudice.’“ ¶ 69 (2007) (emphasis added) ( ¶ 17 (2006)).

¶ 7 (2015) ( ¶ 33 (2007)).

¶14 To prevail on this issue of prosecutorial misconduct, Ware must show that “(1) misconduct exists and (2) ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.’” ¶ 46 (2007) (quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson II), ¶ 45 (2005)).

A defendant is not entitled to relief based on an assertion of prosecutorial misconduct unless the misconduct is “so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial,” rendering “the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46, (citations omitted).

¶ 46 (2007); ¶ 26 (1998).

However, our supreme court still recognizes the applicability of the doctrine, ¶¶33-36 , and we have no authority to overrule its direction, , 41 n. 1, ¶ 9, , 783 n. 1 (App.2000) ( , ).

¶ 47, (whether “persistent and pervasive misconduct” occurred depends on cumulative effect of alleged errors (citation omitted)).

“We review a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence of corpus delicti for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 33

To constitute reversible error, the misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial, and “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46, (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Under that standard, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’ ” ¶ 28 , ( ¶ 77 , ).

¶11 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

“We review a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence of corpus delicti for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 33, (citations omitted) (italics added).4 ¶9 “The corpus delicti doctrine ensures that a defendant’s conviction is not based upon an uncorroborated confession or incriminating statement.” Id.

A jury does not abuse its discretion in reaching a death verdict “if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain’ those conclusions.” Villalobos, 225 Ariz. at 83 ¶ 41, 235 P.3d at 236 ( ¶ 77, ).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46

To warrant reversal, the defendant must show “that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 46, (citation omitted).