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A jury does not abuse its discretion in reaching a death verdict “if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain’ those conclusions.” Villalobos, 225 Ariz. at 83 ¶ 41, 235 P.3d at 236 ( ¶ 77, ).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46

To warrant reversal, the defendant must show “that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 46, (citation omitted).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 46, (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46, (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 46, (internal 2 STATE v. WILSON Decision of the Court citation omitted).

A finding of aggravating circumstances is not an abuse of discretion if “’there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 36, ( ¶ 77, ).

¶ 77, (Under an abuse of discretion standard, “we uphold a decision if there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We will not find “an abuse of discretion if ‘there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain [the findings and sentences].’” ¶36, ( ¶ 77, ).

Under that standard, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’ ” ¶ 28 , ( ¶ 77 , ).

( ¶ 81, 160 P.3d at 203, 220 (2007)).

at 570 ¶ 51, 242 P.3d at 169 ( ¶ 81, ).

¶ 79, (upholding especial cruelty when state offered evidence that victims suffered and struggled during strangulation); ¶ 10, (“[D]efensive wounds, .

A finding of aggravating circumstances or the imposition of a death sentence “is not an abuse of discretion if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 42, ( ¶ 77, ).

“A finding of aggravating circumstances or the imposition of a death sentence is not an abuse of discretion if ‘there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 36, ( ¶ 77, ).

“A finding of aggravating circumstances or the imposition of a death sentence is not an abuse of discretion if ‘there is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’” ¶ 36, ( ¶ 77, ).

Even if we assume that Rose, absent his waiver, “was entitled to attend the [juror] prescreening process,” ¶ 45, no fundamental error arose regarding Rose’s absence from three days of that process.

To prove this aggravator, the state must establish “that a victim was conscious and suffered physical pain or mental anguish before death and that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim would suffer.” ¶ 79

Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, “we uphold a decision if there is ‘any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.’”