Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Harrod, 183 P.3d 519.

74 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Joseph Michael Nolan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2026
State of Arizona v. William Maurice Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2026
State of Arizona v. Timothy Andrew Parkinson 554 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
State of Arizona v. Timothy Andrew Parkinson 554 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967)
State v. Givens Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
State v. Givens Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Karen Fann v. State of Arizona 493 P.3d 246 Ariz. 2021
Karen Fann v. State of Arizona 493 P.3d 246 Ariz. 2021
State v. Hand Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Hand Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
¶16 “A trial court’s decision whether to allow a party to call a witness before the jury who will assert his Fifth Amendment privilege is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 19 (2008).
State of Arizona v. Alan Matthew Champagne 447 P.3d 297 Ariz. 2019
State of Arizona v. Alan Matthew Champagne 447 P.3d 297 Ariz. 2019
State of Arizona v. Charles Michael Hedlund 431 P.3d 181 Ariz. 2018
State of Arizona v. Charles Michael Hedlund 431 P.3d 181 Ariz. 2018
¶¶ 63–64 (2008) (affirming the defendant’s death sentence when the sole aggravating factor, pecuniary gain, was weighed against the mitigating evidence presented); –74 ¶¶ 77–79 (2005) (same); Spears, 184 Ariz. at 295 (same).
State v. Clayborn Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Clayborn Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
“A trial court’s decision whether to allow a party to call a witness before the jury who will assert his Fifth Amendment privilege is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 19 (2008).
State v. Bustillos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Bustillos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State of Arizona v. Abel Daniel Hidalgo 390 P.3d 783 Ariz. 2017
State of Arizona v. Abel Daniel Hidalgo 390 P.3d 783 Ariz. 2017
State v. Love Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Love Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Stewart Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 23 (App. 2009) (citing Henderson, 220 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19, ¶ 35 (2008)).
State v. Acosta Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Acosta Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶11 Second, the superior court may completely excuse a witness from testifying when it “possesses extensive knowledge about the case” and “determines that a witness could legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions.” ¶¶ 20- 21, (quotations and citation omitted).
State v. Leon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Leon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
When the trial court “determines that a witness could legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions, then that witness may be totally excused without violating an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.” ¶ 20 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
State v. Hollingsworth Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Hollingsworth Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
For prosecutorial misconduct to qualify as fundamental error, the error must be “so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” ¶ 35, 16 STATE v. HOLLINGSWORTH Decision of the Court (quoting Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 26, 969 P.2d at 1191).
State v. Summers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Summers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
On a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 35
State v. Sandoval Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Sandoval Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 35, (internal citation omitted).
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo 321 P.3d 398 Ariz. 2014
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo 321 P.3d 398 Ariz. 2014
We review constitutional claims de novo, ¶ 38, and a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion, State v. Dann (Dann I), ¶ 43
State of Arizona v. John Vincent Fitzgerald 303 P.3d 519 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. John Vincent Fitzgerald 303 P.3d 519 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Ronnie Lovelle Joseph 283 P.3d 27 Ariz. 2012
State of Arizona v. Gilbert Martinez 282 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2012
State of Arizona v. Gilbert Martinez 282 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2012
“A trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence in the penalty phase is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 38
State of Arizona v. Ronnie Lovelle Joseph 283 P.3d 27 Ariz. 2012
State v. Harrod (Harrod III), -79 ¶¶ 37-39, -30 (2008); ¶ 67
State v. Pete J. Vanwinkle 285 P.3d 308 Ariz. 2012
State v. Pete J. Vanwinkle 285 P.3d 308 Ariz. 2012
State v. Harrod (Harrod III), -79 ¶¶ 37-39, -30 (2008); ¶ 67
State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom 280 P.3d 1244 Ariz. 2012
State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom 280 P.3d 1244 Ariz. 2012
“[A] defendant has no constitutional right to present residual doubt evidence at sentencing.” ¶ 109, see also State v. Harrod (Harrod III), ¶ 46
State of Arizona v. Francisco Antonio Lopez 279 P.3d 640 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Francisco Antonio Lopez 279 P.3d 640 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
For prosecutorial misconduct to qualify as fundamental error, the error must be “‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” State v. Harrod, 218 Ariz. 268, ¶ 35
State v. Cota 272 P.3d 1027 Ariz. 2012
State v. Cota 272 P.3d 1027 Ariz. 2012