Cited by

Further, even assuming the court erred in refusing to grant Sosa immunity, Ahrens has failed to show how not giving Sosa immunity deprived him from presenting a complete defense because he made no showing that Sosa’s testimony “would present clearly exculpatory evidence.” -29, ¶¶ 25-29 (2008) (citation omitted).

State v. (Cody J.) Martinez, ¶ 59 (2008).

¶ 36 (1999); ¶ 22 (2008).

¶ 42 (2018) (stating that “pecuniary gain need not be the only motive for the (F)(5) aggravator to apply”); ¶ 66 (2008) (“Pecuniary gain .

aggravator to apply.”); ¶ 66 (2008) (“Pecuniary gain .

See, ¶ 66 (2008) (“Pecuniary gain .

4 ¶ 27 (2008) (“[W]hen a witness has continued reason to fear prosecution, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compel that witness’s testimony may be properly limited.” (citations omitted)).

Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant may compel a witness to testify, but that “right is not absolute and will give way when the witness’s preservation of his own Fifth Amendment rights would prevent him from answering relevant questions.” ¶ 26 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Corp., ); ¶ 75 (2010) ( ¶ 49 (2008)); ¶ 5 (App. 2007).

We previously rejected this argument in State v. (Cody J.) Martinez, ¶¶ 61–62, and declined to reconsider that decision in Cota, 229 Ariz. at 153 ¶ 92, 272 P.3d at 1044 (citing (Cody J.) Martinez in observing “we have already determined that abuse of discretion review is constitutional”), and Hausner, 230 Ariz. at 80 ¶¶ 83–84, 280 P.3d at 624 (“We decline

See, e.g., State v. (Gilbert) Martinez, ¶ 54, ¶ 40–41, ¶ 67, State v. (Cody J.) Martinez, ¶ 44

“This Court will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct only when (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 15, (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 because he has not alleged or shown any prejudice, and “[n]o evidence suggests that the sentencing jury was not fair and impartial.” Id.; ¶ 35, (“We need not address this argument because the juror in question was not seated and [the defendant] makes no claim that any of the jurors who decided his case should have been struck for cause.”).

P.3d 348 (2008), rejected arguments that the Eighth Amendment requires independent review of death sentences, Hausner argues that Martinez did not consider the importance of independent review in ensuring that Arizona’s sentencing scheme “genuinely narrows the

To establish cruelty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” ¶ 70, 7 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).