Cited by

4 STATE V. VARGAS Opinion of the Court fundamental error review in considering misconduct claims), –92 ¶ 74 (2008) (making an explicit distinction between the standard of review if the defendant has objected to error or not); compare Roque, 213 Ariz. at 228 ¶ 155 (2006) (stating that after reviewing an allegation for error, a court must then assess whether to include it for cumulative error review before then e

But we have never held that a jury must compare one murder to another, and we have expressly rejected the argument that juries must be informed of any comparison to the “norm.” –88 ¶¶ 47–50 (2008).

See State v. 7 ¶ 87 (2008) (requiring the state to “show that the defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred,” because “[a] showing that a defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred provides essentia

Supra ¶¶ 16–22; see, –35 ¶¶ 169–71 (2015) (affirming a death sentence despite a “difficult childhood” and “dysfunctional family”); ¶ 111 (2008) (“Also, Bocharski committed this offense when he was thirty-three years old, lessening the relevance of abuse and neglect that occurred during his childhood.”).

¶27 Furthermore, although Marquez argues the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s conduct both before and at trial caused him prejudice, having found no action by the prosecutor that constitutes misconduct, “there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.” ¶ 75 (2008).

¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶ 75 (2008) ("Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.").

at 25–26 ¶ 16 ( ¶¶ 86–87 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶40 In this case, having found no action by the prosecutor that constitutes misconduct, “there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.” ¶ 75

Even if individual acts of misconduct do not necessitate reversal, we must decide whether the acts collectively evidence “persistent and pervasive misconduct.” –92 ¶ 74, –19 (2008) (citation omitted).

¶47 Because Gurrieri has not demonstrated any instance of prosecutorial misconduct, “there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.” ¶ 75 (2008).

“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.” ¶ 75 (2008).

We also review de novo “whether jury instructions correctly state the law.” , 487 ¶ 47

We also review de novo “whether jury instructions correctly state the law.” ¶ 47

6 ¶18 Because no misconduct occurred in any of the three individual instances, no cumulative misconduct occurred.7 ¶ 75, (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶ 75, (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶ 60 (2008) (); see also Lennar Corp. v. Transamerica Ins.

See, e.g., State v. (Gilbert) Martinez, ¶ 54, ¶ 40–41, ¶ 67, State v. (Cody J.) Martinez, ¶ 44

¶ 75, (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶¶ 40–41, (erroneous admission of evidence was harmless error when other, non-tainted proof clearly supported same facts).

See State v. Bocharski (Bocharski II), ¶ 53

¶¶ 38-41, (holding Confrontation Clause and hearsay rule violations are subject to harmless error analysis, and any such error was harmless because the objected-to testimony was “superfluous” to other witnesses’ testimony to the same effect); 650 P.