Cited by

¶¶ 38–41 (2008) (analyzing evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause for harmless error).

orial error may result “if the cumulative effect of the alleged acts of misconduct ‘shows that the prosecutor intentionally 9 STATE v. LUJAN Decision of the Court engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.’” ¶ 74 (2008) (citation omitted); see also Arias, 248 Ariz. at 556 ¶ 32.

¶ 12 (2008) (“We review a failure to provide timely notice of aggravating circumstances for prejudice.”).

¶ 38 (2008) (-81, ¶ 39 (2000)) (We review hearsay violations for harmless error, and error is harmless “when the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not impact the verdict.”).

By granting Gallegos’s request for a new aggravation phase jury trial without any legal basis, the superior court exceeded the scope of its authority.1 1 We find Gallegos’s unavailing.

(“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of [prosecutorial error], there can be no cumulative effect of [error] sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

16 STATE v. GOMES Decision of the Court ¶68 “Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.” ¶ 75 (2008).

¶33 Daniel contends he was deprived of a fair trial by the State’s “course of intentional misconduct.” “We will reverse a conviction because of prosecutorial [error] if misconduct is present and ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that [it] could have affected the jury’s verdict.’” ¶ 74 (2008) ( 8 STATE v. DANIEL Decision of the Court ¶ 45 (2005)).

See (James C.) Johnson, 247 Ariz. at 183 ¶ 30 (finding defendant should have known carving into victim’s stomach was unnecessary after making multiple cuts, including one four inches deep, into victim’s neck); ¶ 90 (2008) 17 STATE OF ARIZONA V. DWANDARRIUS JAMAR ROBINSON Opinion of the Court (concluding mens rea not established where defendant “used only a knife to inflict the wounds and completed his attack very rapidly”).

Under that doctrine, “the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of that case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate courts.” ¶ 60 (2008) (citation omitted).

¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of [error], there can be no cumulative effect of [error] sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶ 75 (2008) 13 STATE v. ANDERSON Decision of the Court (“Absent any finding of [error], there can be no cumulative effect of [error] sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶25 Because we do not find any of these instances amounted to prosecutorial error, “there can be no cumulative effect of [error] sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.” ¶ 75 (2008).

¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”); ¶ 26 (1998) (explaining that alleged prosecutorial error instances are evaluated for cumulative effect).

¶146 Finally, because none of these instances amount to prosecutorial error, we need not consider if the individual acts collectively amount to “persistent and pervasive misconduct.” Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 280 ¶ 91; ¶ 75 (2008) (holding that “[a]bsent any finding of [error], there can be no cumulative effect”).

idence showing the defendant “acted lucidly in planning and executing the crimes and in attempting to dispose of and hide the murder weapon” undermines arguments of significant impairment); McKinney I, 245 Ariz. at 227 ¶ 10 (finding PTSD mitigation evidence insufficiently substantial to warrant leniency when defendant’s actions during the murder were “planned and deliberate”); ¶ 111 (2008) (finding weight of defendant’s alcohol impairment weakened by his “purposeful steps to avoid prosecution”);

¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).

¶37 Finally, although Madrigal argues the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s conduct caused him prejudice, having found no action by the prosecutor that constitutes misconduct, “there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.” ¶ 75 (2008).

¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of misconduct, there can be no cumulative effect of misconduct sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”).