Cited by

¶ 33 (2008); ¶ 27 (App. 2003) ("When an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.").

¶ 30 (2010); ¶¶ 75–76 (2008).

“The facts establishing an aggravating circumstance, or the circumstances of the murder more generally, ‘are relevant during the penalty phase because they tend to show whether the defendant should be shown leniency.’” Guarino, 238 Ariz. at 440 ¶ 13 ( ¶ 38 (2008)).

5 See *387 State v. Armstrong , , ¶ 20, , 385 (2008) (harmless-error review places burden on state to prove beyond reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to or affect sentencing outcome); cf. State v. Ring , , ¶ 79, , 941 (2003) ("In those instances in which no reasonable jury could find that the state

¶ 33 (2008) (harmless error analysis applies to Confrontation Clause violations); 4 IN RE ISMAEL N. Decision of the Court ¶ 132 (2004) (error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

[into] allocution and thereby insulate that mitigating circumstance from rebuttal evidence.’” Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 32, 236 P.3d at 1178 ( ¶ 59, ).

The facts establishing an aggravating circumstance, or the circumstances of the murder more generally, “are relevant during the penalty phase because they tend to show whether the defendant should be shown leniency.” ¶ 38

Although a prosecutor may argue that the defendant does not deserve leniency based on the facts of a case, ¶ 38, “it is improper [for the state] to argue a non-alleged aggravating circumstance,” ¶ 40

See, e.g., State v. Armstrong (Armstrong III), -65 ¶¶ 68-71, -92 (2008) (finding a motivational relationship when the defendant killed a second person to avoid getting caught for killing the first).

We review de novo statutory interpretation issues, State v. Armstrong (Armstrong III), ¶ 54, and whether jury instructions properly state the law, ¶ 15

(F)(8) Aggravator ¶73 To prove the (F)(8) aggravator, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicides took place during a “continuous course of criminal conduct” and were “temporally, spatially, and motivationally related.” State v. Armstrong (Armstrong III), ¶ 67, ( ¶ 15, ).

¶¶ 52-53, -72 (2007) (upholding admission of evidence of a murder in a separate incident as relevant to whether defendant deserved leniency); ¶ 38

n to suppress wiretap evidence for an abuse of discretion, State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 273 ¶ 14, rev’d on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and review questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo, ¶ 54

State v. Armstrong, 218 Ariz. 451, 463 ¶¶ 54-59

P. 19.3(c)(1); ¶ 32, (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).

Because the statutory language is mandatory, ¶ 28, the superior court erred in not ordering an evaluation, ¶ 15, (finding error in failure to order statutorily required mental retardation prescreening).

[into] allocution and thereby insulate that mitigating circumstance from rebuttal evidence.” ¶ 59

Evidentiary rulings based on constitutional law or statutory construction, however, are reviewed de novo.” ¶ 20 , (internal citation omitted).

¶ 9 “The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial hearsay unless (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the defendant ‘had a prior opportunity to cross-examine’ the declarant.” ¶ 32 , (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 , 124 S.Ct.