Cited by

¶ 72 (2009) (“Mistrial is the ‘most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” ( ¶ 43 (2003))).

¶25 “[T]he inadvertent exposure of a handcuffed or shackled defendant to members of the jury outside the courtroom is not inherently prejudicial, and a defendant is not entitled to a new trial absent a showing of actual prejudice.” ¶ 74 (2009) (quotation omitted).

¶ 23 (2009); ¶ 47 (2022) (“Reviewing courts defer to the trial judge’s perceptions of the juror and question only whether the judge’s findings are supported by the record.”).

is between material exculpatory evidence and potentially useful evidence.” ¶ 37 (2009) (quotation omitted).

¶17 “Mistrial is the ‘most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” ¶ 72 (2009) ( ¶ 43 (2003)).

“[R]eversal is warranted if a reasonable likelihood exists that the [prosecutorial error] could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 42 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); ¶ 38 (2012) (explaining prosecutorial error is harmless when 2 Vazquez absconded on the final day of trial and was eventually sentenced in 2019.

¶ 72 (2009) (“Mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.”).

¶ 37 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 (2004)).

¶ 44 (2009) (concluding the prosecutor’s “entirely unprofessional” statements, uttered “outside the presence of the jury,” did not deprive the 24 STATE v. ARIAS Opinion of the Court egregious, the prosecutor: (1)

A mistrial is the “most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 72 (2009) ( ¶ 43 (2003)).

¶6 “Mistrial is an extraordinary remedy for trial error ‘and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” ¶ 61 (2013) ( ¶ 72 (2009)).

Glissendorf II , , ¶ 8, (quoting State v. Smith , , 227, , 514 (1988) ); see also State v. Speer , , ¶ 40, ; State v. Broughton , , 399, , 488 (1988).

¶ 44 (2009) (concluding the prosecutor’s “entirely unprofessional” statements uttered “outside the presence of the jury” did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial).

See State v. Speer , , ¶¶ 40-41

“We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for [an] abuse of discretion.” ¶ 52 (2012) ( ¶ 72 (2009)).

A defendant is entitled to a Willits instruction upon proving: “(1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice.” ¶ 8 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2009), ).

¶ 57 (2009) (holding defendant’s knowledge could be established by circumstantial evidence).

See, e.g., State v. Speer, 3 STATE v. BERMUDEZ Decision of the Court ¶ 41, (observing that defendant did not demonstrate how missing evidence might have exonerated him or mitigated his participation in the crime); (noting there was “nothing except speculation” to suggest that license plate numbe

be entitled to a Willits instruction, a defendant must prove that (1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice.” ( ); ¶ 40

¶50 A court must give a Willits instruction if the defendant shows “(1) that the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence having a tendency to exonerate him, and (2) that this failure resulted in prejudice.” ¶ 40, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).