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And we “consider the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury received the information necessary to arrive at a legally correct decision.” ¶ 51 (2009).

3 STATE v. CURTISS Decision of the Court thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 50 (2009) (citation omitted).

¶ 115 (2009); ¶ 11 (App. 2020); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

We consider instructions “as 4 STATE v. MORENO Opinion of the Court a whole to determine whether the jury received the information necessary to arrive at a legally correct decision.”

¶13 “A prospective pro se litigant must understand (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, and (3) the possible punishment upon conviction.” State v. 4 ¶ 24 (2009) (-24 (1994)).

We “consider the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury received the information necessary to arrive at a legally correct decision.”

-64 ¶ 51 (2009) (citing cases); ¶ 2 (App. 1999) (citing cases).

“We consider the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury received the information necessary to arrive at a legally correct decision.” ¶ 51 (2009) (citation omitted).

The jury is properly instructed when it has “received the information necessary to arrive at a legally correct decision.” ¶ 51 (2009).

-64, ¶ 51 (2009) (citations omitted).

But it is possible for a victim-impact statement to become “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” ¶ 98 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)).

See, ¶ 86 (2014); ¶ 65 (2009); –41, ¶¶ 49–50 (2003) (collecting cases).

“Victim impact evidence should not be allowed, however, if it is ‘so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.’” State v. Dann (“Dann III”), ¶ 98 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)).

¶ 134 (2009); ¶ 137 (2009).

ary, and intelligent waiver of his Sixth Amendment and state constitutional right to counsel, includes that “the defendant should first be warned of the risks of self-representation so the defendant ‘knows what [the defendant] is doing and [the] choice is made with open eyes.’” McLemore, ¶¶ 14, 22 (alterations in Mclemore) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835); (“A prospective pro se litigant must understand (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the dangers and disadvantages of self-repres

Additionally, “[w]e consider the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury received the information necessary to arrive at a legally correct decision.” ¶ 51 (2009).

¶ 16 (2009) (citing U.S. Const. amends.

requested jury instructions.’” –64 ¶ 51 (2009) (quoting State ex rel.

at 508 ¶ 81 ( ¶ 79 (2009)).

We review for abuse of discretion the court’s refusal to give Robinson’s requested instruction, –64 ¶ 51 (2009), and we review de novo the legal accuracy of its given instruction, reading it “as a whole to ensure that the jury receives the information it needs to arrive at a legally correct decision,” Prince, 226 Ariz. at 536 ¶ 77 (quoting State ex rel.

We have before held that the multiple homicides aggravator, found here, is given “extraordinary weight.” ¶ 43 (2020); State v. Dann (Dann II), –77 ¶ 153 (2009).