Cited by

But the authority for that proposition, our court’s and our supreme court’s do not hold that a juror’s previous victimization may never compel mandatory disqualification―only that it does not necessarily do so.

010) (“[T]he trial court was not required to give an instruction on parole eligibility because, irrespective of any likelihood that he would die in prison, Garcia was not technically ineligible for parole.”); –15 ¶ 53 (2010) (“Unlike Simmons, Hargrave was eligible for release after twenty-five years, as the jury instruction correctly stated.”); ¶ 43 (2010) (finding that jury instruction “accurately described the statutory sentencing options” and thus did not mislead the jury (citing § 13-751(A))

¶25 The corpus delicti rule prevents a conviction based solely on an individual’s “uncorroborated confession or incriminating statement[s].” ¶ 34 (2007) (citation omitted); ¶ 9 (2010).

See, –09 ¶¶ 74–75 (2013); –33 ¶¶ 48–54 (2011); Gallardo, 225 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 21–23; –38 ¶ 27 (2010); State v. Pandeli (“Pandeli III”), –24 ¶¶ 20–21 (2007).

See, –88, ¶ 8 (2015); ¶ 9 (2010); ¶ 34 (2007).

§ 13-751(C); ¶ 37 (2010); Martinez, 218 Ariz. at 431 ¶ 44 n.11.

v. Dep't of Child Safety , , 60, ¶ 19, ; see also State v. Chappell , , 235, ¶ 16, (reviewing "evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of expert opinions for an abuse of discretion").

State v. Chappell , , 235, ¶ 16, , 1182 (2010) (citing State v. Chapple , , 297, , 1224 (1983) ).

¶19 “We review evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of expert opinions for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 16 (2010) (citation omitted).

n.1, ¶ 2 (2012) ( n.1, ¶ 2 (2010).

¶ 28, (recognizing that, in general, evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and the reviewing court defers to the trial court’s determination of relevance).