Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Stummer, 194 P.3d 1043.
- State v. Campo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
- CENTER FOR AZ v. AZ SECRETARY OF STATE Ariz. 2026
- Karen Fann v. State of Arizona 493 P.3d 246 Ariz. 2021
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Karen Fann v. State of Arizona
493 P.3d 246
Ariz. 2021
See, e.g., Empress Adult Video & ¶ 41 (App. 2002) (applying severability analysis to an unconstitutional statute as applied), disapproved on other grounds, ¶ 22 & n.6 (2008); –09 (1976) (same).
- Brush & Nib v. City of Phoenix Ariz. 2019
- Brush & Nib v. City of Phoenix Ariz. 2019
- Brush & Nib v. Phoenix 418 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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Brush & Nib v. Phoenix
418 P.3d 426
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 16 (App. 2008) (applying federal free speech jurisprudence because courts have had limited opportunities to develop Arizona’s free speech clause).
- Kimberly McLaughlin v. Hon. jones/suzan McLaughlin Ariz. 2017
- Kimberly McLaughlin v. Hon. jones/suzan McLaughlin Ariz. 2017
- State v. Randles 334 P.3d 730 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Randles
334 P.3d 730
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
¶ 5, ¶ 7, (constitutionality of statutes reviewed de novo); ¶ 6, (same).
- COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE & FAIRNESS v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office 332 P.3d 94 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE & FAIRNESS v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office 332 P.3d 94 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- Korwin v. Cotton 323 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Korwin v. Cotton
323 P.3d 1200
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
ide these issues under the Arizona Constitution; specifically, Article 2, Section 6, which states: “Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” ¶ 11 The test for determining the constitutionality of “content-based secondary effects regulations” restricting speech, under Article 2, Section 6
- State of Arizona v. Anthony Connue Serrano 323 P.3d 774 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
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State of Arizona v. Anthony Connue Serrano
323 P.3d 774
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
n.5, n.5 (App. 2010) (noting due process right to notice of registration requirement); n.7, n.7 (2008) (observing “sex offender status has significant and far-reaching consequences”); ¶¶ 17, 30, 543-44 (2008) (finding sex offender registration sufficiently severe consequence to trigger certain constitutional procedural rights).
- Coleman v. City of Mesa 284 P.3d 863 Ariz. 2012
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Coleman v. City of Mesa
284 P.3d 863
Ariz. 2012
See, P.3d 1043 (2008) (identifying standard for evaluating content-based secondary effects regulations).
- In re Javier B. 280 P.3d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
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In re Javier B.
280 P.3d 644
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
In the context of adult sex offender registration, our supreme court has observed that "sex offender status has significant and far-reaching consequences.” , 144 n. 7, ¶ 23, , 1050 n. 7 (2008); -93, ¶ 30 , -44 (2008) (holding that sex offender registration is a sufficiently severe consequence so as to require a jury trial in misdemeanor cases involving sexual motivation).
- State v. Cota 272 P.3d 1027 Ariz. 2012
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State v. Cota
272 P.3d 1027
Ariz. 2012
State v. Stummer, 219 Ariz 137, 141 ¶ 7
- Rumery v. Baier 268 P.3d 1120 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
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Rumery v. Baier
268 P.3d 1120
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
See Empress Adult Video & ¶ 29 , (stating the constitutional “framers were presumably aware of existing law”), , 144 n. 6, ¶ 22, , 1050 n. 6 (2008).
- Coleman v. City of Mesa 265 P.3d 422 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
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Coleman v. City of Mesa
265 P.3d 422
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Although our supreme court has held that Article 2, Section 6 affords greater protection to speech than the First Amendment, ¶ 17 , Mountain States Tel.
- State v. Patterson 218 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Patterson 218 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Redistricting Com'n Arizona Independent 208 P.3d 676 Ariz. 2009
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Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Redistricting Com'n Arizona Independent
208 P.3d 676
Ariz. 2009
See, , (analyzing hours-of-operation statute under free speech requirements); , (analyzing burden of proof statute under due process requirements); Aros v. Beneficial Ariz., Inc., , (analyzing consumer lender regulations
- State v. Zamora 202 P.3d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
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State v. Zamora
202 P.3d 528
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)); , 141 n. 3, , 1047 n. 3 (2008) (concurring opinion is considered the controlling opinion if it is "the narrowest opinion joining in the judgment of the Court.") (quoting Center for Fair Pub.