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11 ¶ 16 (2010), finding the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to ask prospective jurors if they could consider imposing a death sentence if a defendant had not actually shot the victim.” The lack of abuse of discretion in Garcia does not mean McCauley’s premeditation question was constitu

¶ 31 (2010) (holding the trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte grant a mistrial for the trial’s guilt phase where the defendant only moved for a mistrial of the aggravation phase and the risk of prejudice was limited to the aggravation phase).

DISCUSSION I. Motion to Suppress ¶8 We defer to the superior court’s factual findings “including findings on credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer.” ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (citation omitted), and consider only the evidence that was presented at the suppression hearing, ¶ 6 (2010).

¶ 77 (2010) (“[T]he trial court was not required to give an instruction on parole eligibility because, irrespective of any likelihood that he would die in prison, Garcia was not technically ineligible for parole.”); –15 ¶ 53 (2010) (“Unlike Simmons, Hargrave was eligible for relea

Prince, 226 Ariz. at 542 ¶ 113 (noting mental health mitigation is weighed in proportion to the defendant’s ability to conform or appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct); ¶ 104 (2010) (finding evidence of long-term drug addiction entitled to little weight because no connection to crime or mental function at time of murder).

We review that finding for “substantial evidence, ‘viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.’” ¶ 54 (2010) (–69 ¶ 45 (2005)).

¶ 44 (2010) (noting that Arizona law “specifically requires the trier of fact to make Enmund/Tison findings in the aggravation phase.”) ( ¶ 46 (2007)).

–9 ¶¶ 14–16 (2010) (allowing case-specific questions in order to “properly probe[] beyond abstract juror views on capital punishment” so long as they “merely asked [whether] jurors .

See, -12, ¶¶ 32-39 (2010) (reviewing evidence admitted during the aggravation phase of a capital trial in determining whether the court abused its discretion in admitting other act evidence); Anthony, 218 Ariz. at 443-45, ¶¶ 26-37 (reviewing evidence presented at trial to determine whether clear and convincing evidence

Furthermore, the state “must establish that ‘pecuniary gain was a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the result.’” ¶ 91 (2010) (emphases added) ( ¶ 91 (2002), superseded by rule on other grounds).

See Burns, 237 Ariz. at 13 ¶ 23 (“A potential juror need not object to the death penalty in every possible case to warrant a dismissal for cause.”); ¶¶ 18–19 (2010) (finding no error in striking juror who was conflicted about imposing the death penalty).

¶ 22 (2010) (a reviewing court defers to the trial court’s assessment of a prosecutor’s credibility).

Corp., ); ¶ 75 (2010) ( ¶ 49 (2008)); ¶ 5 (App. 2007).

We will affirm the superior court’s ruling unless it was clearly erroneous, as a Batson determination is based “largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.” ¶ 22 (2010).

Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 “In analyzing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider ‘only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing,’” and “[w]e view the facts in the light most favorable to support the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress,” id.

Although case- specific voir dire questions are not categorically prohibited, -9, ¶¶ 13-16 (2010), it is improper to use voir dire to 4 STATE v. SUGGS Decision of the Court "condition the jury to the receipt of certain evidence or to a particular view of the evidence."

We defer to the trial court’s ruling regarding the State’s motives for a peremptory strike, ¶ 22, and review the trial court’s application of the law de novo.