Cited by

¶ 35 (2011) (explaining stakeout questions ask jurors to speculate or precommit about how they might vote based on particular facts).

¶ 104 (2011) (stating the Court will take judicial notice of facts that are “so notoriously true as not to be subject to reasonable dispute”).

¶ 89 (2011) ( ¶ 68 (2006)) (concluding that any confusion caused by the prosecutor’s misstatement of law was cured by proper jury instructions).

¶ 57 (2011) (quoting United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000)).

¶23 We read jury instructions “as a whole to ensure that the jury receive[d] the information it need[ed] to arrive at a legally correct decision.” ¶ 77 (2011).

§§ 13-751(E), -752(H); ¶ 16 (2011) (discussing the “jury’s duty to ‘assess whether to impose the death penalty based upon each juror’s individual, qualitative evaluation of the facts of the case, the severity of the aggravating factors, and the quality of any mitigating evidence.’” (quoting State ex rel.

See State v. Prince (Prince II), –37 ¶¶ 78–80 (2011).

See, ¶¶ 99–101 (2011) (victim witnessed mother being beaten, threatened at gunpoint, attempted to escape, and appeared frightened before being shot by defendant).

As we have noted, a trial judge may “strike a juror whose views about capital punishment ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” ¶ 27 (2011) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985)); see also id.

§ 32-4253(B); ¶ 38 (2011).

Juror 6 did not “miss[] large portions of the trial,” or miss “testimony [that] was particularly critical.” ¶¶ 55-58 (2011) (no error, fundamental or otherwise, occurred when the court permitted a juror to deliberate after the juror slept through testimony that was not particularly critical) (internal quotation omitted).

¶ 113 (2011); ¶ 121 (2009).

The right to testify, however, is waived if the defendant does not make the desire to testify known to the superior court at trial; it cannot be raised “as an afterthought.” ¶¶ 45-47 (2011).

¶16 We presume the jurors followed the court’s instructions, ¶ 80 (2011), and under these circumstances, we conclude the court did not err.

See, –09 ¶¶ 74–75 (2013); –33 ¶¶ 48–54 (2011); Gallardo, 225 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 21–23; –38 ¶ 27 (2010); State v. Pandeli (“Pandeli III”), –24 ¶¶ 20–21 (2007).

¶ 80 (2011) (citation omitted).

¶ 51 (2011) (upholding jury instructions from vagueness challenge).