Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Guillen, 223 P.3d 658.

27 citing documents.

State v. Sandoval Beltran Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
State v. Sandoval Beltran Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
State v. Malloy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Malloy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
“Evidence seized following consent to a search must be suppressed if the consent is tainted by a prior constitutional violation.” ¶ 13 (2010); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507–08 (1983) (“Because we affirm the .
State v. Urrea 398 P.3d 584 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
State v. Urrea 398 P.3d 584 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)
State v. Peterman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Peterman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
“[T]o determine whether the taint of [] illegal conduct is sufficiently attenuated from evidence subsequently obtained by voluntary consent,” we consider: “(1) the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) ‘particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’” ¶ 14 (2010) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)).
State of Arizona v. Robin Peoples 378 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Robin Peoples 378 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2016
See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–39 (2011); ¶ 13 n.1, n.1 (2010) (stating that for purposes of the Arizona Constitution, “the exclusionary rule to be applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 11, (“One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.” (citations omitted)).12 ¶18 The primary case relied upon by Appellant is distinguishable.
State v. Bustos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Bustos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Even if a person consents to a search, evidence seized must still be suppressed “if the consent is tainted by a prior constitutional violation.” ¶ 13, (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)).
State of Arizona v. Feliciano Ontiveros-Loya 352 P.3d 941 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Feliciano Ontiveros-Loya 352 P.3d 941 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
goes way too far.” ¶24 Consent is another “long recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”
State v. Loff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Loff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(“One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.” (citation omitted)).
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B. 302 P.3d 609 Ariz. 2013
State v. Hummons 253 P.3d 275 Ariz. 2011
State v. Hummons 253 P.3d 275 Ariz. 2011
See, ¶ 14, (applying attenuation doctrine to consent search following allegedly illegal search); -35, -52 (1996) (upholding search following allegedly illegal arrest); -21
State v. Fisher 250 P.3d 1192 Ariz. 2011
State v. Fisher 250 P.3d 1192 Ariz. 2011
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”3 “Unlawful entry into a home is the ‘chief evil’ against which the provision protects.” ¶ 10
State v. Blakley 243 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State v. Blakley 243 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
B. Consent ¶ 18 “One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.”
State v. Hummons 236 P.3d 1201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State v. Hummons 236 P.3d 1201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); , Monge, 173 Ariz. at 281 , 842 P.2d at 1294 .

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