Cited by

§ 21- 202(B)(3); ¶ 15 (2012) (rejecting constitutional challenge to A.R.S.

–05 ¶ 11, –11 (2013); ¶¶ 13–16, see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367–68 (1979) (holding that the Constitution is not violated if ”a significant state interest“ is ”manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selectio

¶ 11, (“Evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt when the defendant flees ‘in a manner which obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt.’” (citation omitted)).

Specifically, ¶ 88, a death penalty case which held that resentencing was required on the non-capital offenses due to the trial court’s incorrect belief that Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-708 mandated consecutive sentences, should be applied retroactively to his case.

¶5 Based on toolmark analysis of bullets and shell casings, the State’s ballistics expert testified that the same .380 caliber handgun was 1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts, n.2, n.2 (2012).

¶¶ 33-34 (2012) (holding erroneous admission of coerced statements following invocation of right to remain silent did not prejudice defendant and was not fundamental error); (finding no prejudice where erroneously admitted statements were “merely cumulative to other t

¶ 59, (“Prohibiting the calling of a witness should be invoked only in those cases where other less stringent sanctions are not applicable to effect the ends of justice.”).

¶ 60, (holding that the trial court properly denied Cota’s motion to preclude because “he had access to all relevant information” before cross-examining the witness).

We have rejected this argument before, see, ¶ 92, and Miller presents no new reasons that cause us to reconsider it.

In State v. Cota, the prosecutor argued that if the defendant were truly remorseful “wouldn’t he have told the police how sorry he was?” ¶ 83, cert.

We recently stated that § 13-711(A) “creates no presumption in favor of consecutive sentences.” ¶ 78, cert.

2041 , and “[w]e review the trial court’s voluntariness finding for abuse of discretion,” , 144 ¶ 22, (reviewing voluntariness of confession).

§ 13-756(A); ¶¶ 90-92 , (section 13-756 sets appellate standard of review; review of death sentence for abuse of discretion under § 13-756 constitutionally permissible; Constitution does not require independent review of whether "appellate court itself would have imposed a death sentence”).

¶ 40, (“The trial court should excuse a juror ‘[w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Ariz. R. Crim.

¶¶ 91-92, Nelson, 229 Ariz. at 191 ¶ 50, 273 P.3d at 643.

___ ¶ 95, (“Even if we assume that Cota proved each of his alleged mitigating factors, the jury still did not abuse its discretion here by finding the mitigation insufficient to warrant leniency.”); State v. Villalobos, 225

¶57 We review the legal adequacy of a jury instruction de novo, ¶ 77, and find no error.

¶ 92, (citing Martinez in observing “we have already determined that abuse of discretion review is constitutional”).