Cited by

¶26 Our supreme court has held “[n]on-English speakers are not a distinctive group for Sixth Amendment purposes.” ¶ 15 (2012) (citations omitted).

¶ 37 (2012) (“The State’s examination need not mirror that of the defense.”).

(“When a trial court becomes aware of possible juror misconduct, it should ‘conduct whatever investigation it deems warranted.’” ()).

See Eddington, 228 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 18 (juror working for the investigating agency); –47, ¶¶ 39–40 (2012) (juror who became “upset” at a comment made by the prosecutor, reported she felt “humiliated” and “wasn’t sure she could ever side with the State thereafter” and “missed several minutes of testimony because she was upset”).

See, e.g., Burns, 237 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 141 (“[A] family member’s brief remarks about the impact of remembering or visualizing a victim’s final moments were not unduly prejudicial.”); ¶ 57 (2013) (labeling a defendant as a “cop killer” was permissible); ¶¶ 69–71 (2012) (finding a statement describing the victims’ bodies as “mutilated” and “tortured” permissible); –94 ¶¶ 78, 82 (2018) (finding a victim’s statements that her “daughter was shot at close range, like she was worth nothing” and “[c]lose e

A “prosecutor may argue the facts and reasonable inferences from the evidence at the penalty phase,” ¶ 80 (2012), but “it is improper to argue a non-alleged aggravating circumstance,” ¶ 40 (2012).

¶ 85 (2012) (“Use of a prior felony conviction for aggravation and enhancement is expressly authorized by A.R.S.

¶ 45 (2012); ¶¶ 29, 32 (1998) (explaining “[i]t is for the trial court in each instance to exercise sound discretion” to review in-life photographs).

¶ 11 (2012) (“Evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt when the defendant flees in a manner which obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt.”) (citation omitted).

¶208 Although “we have already determined that abuse of discretion review [for death sentences] is constitutional,” ¶ 92 (2012) (citing (Cody J.) Martinez, 218 Ariz. at 434 ¶¶ 61–62), Sammantha contends that “no case addresses [her] argument.” To bolster this claim, she mischaracterizes her facial challenge as an “as applied” challenge.

¶ 14 (2012) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

We review the court’s ruling, or lack thereof, for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 22 (2012), and will not disturb it absent a finding of clear and manifest error, ¶ 26 (2003).

at 283, ¶ 9; ¶ 37 (2012) (“The State’s examination need not mirror that of the defense.”).

¶ 11 (2012); ¶ 12 (App. 1999) (instructing the jury on flight is appropriate when a defendant’s conduct manifests a consciousness of guilt), overruled on other grounds

¶10 In determining whether the superior court erred in admitting a photograph, we consider “(1) the photograph’s relevance, (2) its tendency to inflame the jury, and (3) its probative value compared to its potential to cause unfair prejudice.” -48, ¶ 46 (2012).

___ , ¶ 12 (2018); ¶ 22 (2012); ¶ 51 (2018) (defendant forfeits argument that his confession was involuntary by failing to raise it in the superior court).

“Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a photograph turns on (1) the photograph’s relevance, (2) its tendency to inflame the jury, and (3) its probative value compared to its potential to cause unfair prejudice.” ¶ 46 (2012).

381 , 397 ¶¶ 59-61, , 1095 (2015), and her statements are no more problematic than others this Court has found permissible, see, e.g. , Burns , 237 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 141, 344 P.3d at 332 (describing victim's final moments was "not unduly prejudicial"); State v. Rose , , 513 ¶ 57, , 919 (2013) (finding "cop killer" a permissible statement); State v. Cota , , 150 ¶¶ 69-72, , 1041 (2012) (describing the victims' bodies as "mutilated" and "tortured" permissible).

(“Such photographs cannot be deemed sufficiently gruesome to inflame the jurors because ‘the crime committed was so atrocious that photographs could add little to the repugnance felt by anyone who heard the testimony.’” (citation omitted)); ¶ 46 (2012) (“[T]here is nothing sanitary about murder and sometimes gruesome photographs properly will be introduced.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶¶ 73-74, (trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss a juror accused of sleeping without conducting voir dire; trial court personally observed juror tapping his foot and moving his wrist while his eyes were closed).

§ 21- 202(B)(3); ¶ 15 (2012) (rejecting constitutional challenge to A.R.S.