Cited by

¶ 12 (2012) (“[P]rejudice cannot be presumed without the 23 STATE V. PRESTON ALTON STRONG Opinion of the Court requisite showing that the jury received and considered extrinsic evidence on the issues.” (quoting Davolt, 207 Ariz. at

A “prosecutor may argue the facts and reasonable inferences from the evidence at the penalty phase,” ¶ 80 (2012), but “it is improper to argue a non-alleged aggravating circumstance,” ¶ 40 (2012).

the totality of the circumstances.’” ¶ 39 (2012) ( ¶ 33 (2003)).

Even then, Rule 24.1(d) bars consideration of testimony or an affidavit relating “to the subjective motives or mental processes leading a juror to agree or disagree with the verdict.” –91, ¶ 47 (2012) (citing Ariz. R. Crim.

of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18,” the Eighth Amendment now prohibits it, as well); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 413, 423 (noting that forty-four states did not provide for capital punishment in cases of rape to hold the Eighth Amendment prohibited sentence of death for raping a child under twelve because defendant did not kill nor intend to kill the victim); ¶ 33 (2012) (noting the cases of Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy “turned on the characteristics of the defendant or the nature of th

Courts “look[] at the context in which the statements were made as well as ‘the entire record and to the totality of the circumstances.’” ¶ 39 (2012) ( ¶ 33 (2003)).

We will not, however, presume prejudice “without the requisite showing that the jury received and considered extrinsic evidence on the issues.” (emphasis added) ( ¶ 59 (2004)).

“[R]eversal is warranted if a reasonable likelihood exists that the [prosecutorial error] could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 42 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); ¶ 38 (2012) (explaining prosecutorial error is harmless when 2 Vazquez absconded on the final day of trial and was eventually sentenced in 2019.

¶ 24 (2012); Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 174; -43 (1989); (“The general rule is that negligent homicide is a lesser-included offense of manslaughter and the only difference between the offenses is an accused’s mental state at the

We review for harmless error, ¶ 44 (App. 2014), and find none because the jury convicted Clay of first- degree murder after receiving jury instructions on first-degree and second- degree murder, ¶ 24 (2012) (“When a jury is given a choice between first-degree murder and second-degree murder and convicts on first-degree murder, it has necessarily rejected manslaughter.”).

(internal quotation marks omitted) ( ¶ 39 (2012)).

¶ 18 (2012) (finding a defendant’s actions after a murder, including concealing evidence, can support a finding of premeditation); (noting defendant disposed of the victim’s body when finding sufficient evidence of premeditation).

an argument constitutes misconduct, we consider the context in which it was made and consider two factors: “(1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 196 (2016) ( ¶ 39 (2012)).

¶ 45 (2012) (“We presume jurors follow their instructions.”).

¶ 46 (2012) (noting that a prosecutor’s improper argument “took up less than one page out of more than twenty pages of transcript”).

The general rule, known as Lord Mansfield’s rule, is that a juror’s testimony is not admissible to impeach the verdict.” ¶ 48 (2012) ( ).

¶45 In State v. Nelson, we rejected the argument that the (F)(9) aggravator is overbroad, noting, “It is difficult to imagine an aggravating factor less susceptible than (F)(9) to a challenge on the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth.” ¶ 27 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1078 (D. Ariz. 2006)).

When determining whether an argument is misconduct, “we consider two factors: (1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 39