Cited by

In considering whether an argument constitutes misconduct, this court “looks at the context in which the statements were made as well as the entire record and [] the totality of the circumstances.” ¶ 39 (2012) (citation omitted).

¶ 39 (2012) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

In considering whether argument is misconduct, this court “looks at the context in which the statements were made as well as the entire record and to the totality of the circumstances.” ¶ 39 (2012) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

¶ 43, (“Statements referring to the victim’s family members are not improper .

¶ 16 (2012) (finding that bringing the murder weapon to the scene is strong evidence of premeditation).

In considering whether a prosecutor's argument is misconduct, this court "looks at the context in which the statements were made as well as 'the entire record and to the totality of the circumstances.'" ¶ 39 (2012) ( ¶ 33 (2003)).

In determining whether an argument is misconduct, “we ‘consider two factors: (1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.’” ¶ 39, (quoting Newell, 212 Ariz. at 402 ¶ 60, 132 P.3d at 846).

Juror misconduct requires a new trial only if the defendant proves actual prejudice or “if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.” ¶ 12 (2012) ( ¶ 58 (2004)).

11 STATE v. QUIMAYOUSIE Decision of the Court ¶30 Juror misconduct requires a new trial only if the defendant proves actual prejudice or “if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.” ¶ 12, ( ¶ 58, ).

¶ 45, (citation omitted).

¶ 12, (“prejudice cannot be presumed without the requisite showing that the jury received and considered extrinsic evidence on the issues”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

¶ 21, –58 ¶ 45, –41 (2006).

Although a prosecutor may argue that the defendant does not deserve leniency based on the facts of a case, ¶ 38, “it is improper [for the state] to argue a non-alleged aggravating circumstance,” ¶ 40

We will reverse only if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 36 (App. 2012) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).

In considering whether an argument constitutes misconduct, we consider “the context in which the statements were made.” ¶ 39

(“Thompson does not suggest that giving the entire instruction constitutes error.”).

Aggravating circumstances serve this narrowing function by channeling and limiting the sentencer’s discretion, thereby minimizing “the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” ¶ 26, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶66 “When a jury is given a choice between first-degree murder and second-degree murder and convicts on first-degree murder, it has necessarily rejected manslaughter,” and “any purported error in failing to give a manslaughter instruction was harmless.” ¶ 24, see also Cota, 229 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 66, 272 P.3d at 1041.

-87 ¶¶ 25-28, -39 (2012) (reaching same conclusion regarding A.R.S.