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show that 10 STATE OF ARIZONA V. EDWARD LITTLETON MCCAULEY Opinion of the Court Mr. McCauley did not know right from wrong to prove the statutory mitigator.” But this Court has described § 13-751(G)(1)’s “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct” as the capacity to “know[] right from wrong.” See, ¶¶ 100–104 (2013); ¶¶ 73–76 (1998)

¶ 34 (2013) (citation omitted).

¶ 64 (2013) (“The portions of [the substitute doctor’s] testimony concerning his independent conclusions also did not violate the Confrontation Clause[.]”); ¶ 36 (2011) (“Our cases teach that a testifying medical examiner may, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, rely on in

has no general duty or authority to second-guess the strategic decisions by trial counsel.” ¶ 35 (2013).

Moreover, “Williams is a plurality decision and has limited if any precedential value,” ¶ 52 (App. 2015), so it provides “no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.” ¶ 60 (2013).

“A Batson challenge involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the [defendant] proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 86 ¶ 63 ( ¶ 44 (2013)).

ant’s failure to raise issue below “deprived the prosecutor of the opportunity to distinguish allegedly similarly situated jurors and divested the trial court of the occasion to conduct an in-depth comparison of the jurors”); Smith, (refusing to conduct comparative analysis because defendant “did not raise the issue in the trial court” and therefore waived it); ¶¶ 48-49 (2013) (appellate court not required to conduct comparative juror analysis on “cold appellate record,” particularly when issue

¶5 A Batson challenge “involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful racial discrimination.” ¶ 44 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Challenging a peremptory strike under Batson “involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the challenger proved purposeful racial discrimination.” ¶ 44 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

¶¶ 70–73 (2013); see also Stargel v. State, 436 S.E.2d 786, 788 (Ga.

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995); ¶ 44 (2013) (same).

P. 18.4(b) (stating that the superior court must excuse a potential juror if there is a “reasonable ground to believe” the juror “cannot render a fair and impartial verdict”); ¶ 38 (2013) (striking a prospective juror for cause is appropriate if the 4 STATE v. BUFFINGTON Decision of the Court juror’s opinions would substantially impair the performance of the juror’s duties).

“A Batson challenge involves three steps: (1) The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for each strike, and (3) the trial court must determine whether the [defendant] proved purposeful racial discrimination.” ¶ 44 (2013) ( ¶ 12 (2012)).

–05, ¶ 48 (2013) (declining to engage in a comparative juror analysis “when the similarities between peremptorily stricken jurors and those remaining on the panel were not raised at trial”).

at 2244, 2246–51; ¶ 48 (2013) (declining to perform comparative analysis when comparison not raised at trial).

See, –09 ¶¶ 74–75 (2013); –33 ¶¶ 48–54 (2011); Gallardo, 225 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 21–23; –38 ¶ 27 (2010); State v. Pandeli (“Pandeli III”), –24 ¶¶ 20–21 (2007).

See Vasquez, 130 Ariz. at 107 ("Idle conversation relating to subjects unrelated to the case is generally not grounds for a mistrial."); ¶ 67 (2013) (finding no error "[g]iven the brevity of the contact between the juror and the victim's daughter and the absence of any discussion concerning the case or the defendant").

¶ 49 (2013) ("We decline to examine more detailed comparisons than were alleged at trial.").

); State v. Medina , , 406 ¶ 57

¶¶ 61–62, (autopsy report created to determine manner and cause of death is nontestimonial).

ted jurors or to clarify which factors were given more weight in the choice to strike,” and “the trial court did not have an opportunity to conduct an in-depth comparison of the jurors who were stricken and those 13 STATE V. ESCALANTE-OROZCO Opinion of the Court who remained on the panel.” ¶ 49