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“The Confrontation Clause bars admission of out of court testimonial evidence unless the defense has had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” ¶ 38 (2013).

¶9 A flight instruction should only be given where “the State presents evidence of flight after a crime from which jurors can infer a defendant’s consciousness of guilt.” ¶ 7 (App. 2014) ( ¶ 44 (2013)).

The superior court has broad discretion in addressing such a motion, ¶ 78 (2013), and we find no error in its ruling.

As the Arizona Supreme Court has noted, “[n]o Arizona case has required a third-party culpability instruction” because the “substance of the instruction [is] adequately covered” by the instructions “on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crimes charged.” ¶¶ 55–56 (2013).

To determine whether a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation occurred, we consider “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

¶ 7 (App. 2014); ¶ 44 (2013).

-08, ¶¶ 69-73 (2013); see also West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16.

as part of their ordinary course of business.” ¶ 33 (2013).

¶¶ 17–18 (2013) (finding no prejudice to Sixth Amendment speedy trial right because 4 STATE v. GONZALES Decision of the Court the defendant “asserted no prejudice except that arising from his pretrial incarceration.

A court may give a flight instruction "if the state presents evidence from which jurors may infer 'consciousness of guilt for the crime charged.'" ¶ 44 (2013) ().

¶ 74 (2013) (reviewing denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion).

6 STATE V. ROBERTSON Opinion of the Court ¶19 in support of the propriety of applying the invited error doctrine to situations “where an error results from stipulations in a voluntary plea agreement.” Robertson, 246 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 16.

“We assess prejudice in light of the interests that the speedy trial right protects against: (1) ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration,’ (2) ‘anxiety and concern of the accused,’ and (3) ‘the possibility that the defense will be impaired’ by diminishing memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.” ¶ 16 (2013) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).

¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

-02, ¶ 33 (2013) (holding a credit card company’s custodian laid sufficient foundation for admitting business records even though the company’s merchant―not the company or the custodian―created the records).

¶11 Before the superior court may give a flight instruction, the State must present evidence of flight after a crime from which jurors may infer a defendant’s “consciousness of guilt for the crime charged.” ¶ 44 (2013) ().

A court may find records prepared by a third party to be trustworthy business records if the entity relies on the third-party prepared 3 NCSL v. MILIC, et al. Decision of the Court records “as part of their ordinary course of business.” ¶ 33 (2013).

¶¶ 35-36 (2013) (co-worker's testimony that it was the author's habit to record or log hours each day and that he recognized author's handwriting was sufficient foundation to admit handwritten timesheets under Rule 803(6)); Petzoldt, 172 Ariz. at 275; Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat.

at 410; ¶ 33 (2013) (“Trustworthiness and reliability stem from the fact that [a business] regularly relies on the information that third parties submit as part of their ordinary course of business.”).