Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker, 296 P.3d 54.
- State v. Farr Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Farr
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
In evaluating such claims, courts weigh (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
- State v. Cardwell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Cardwell
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 55, (citing Prion, 203 Ariz. at 161-62, ¶¶ 19-27, 52 P.3d at 193-94; Gibson, 202 Ariz. at 323-24, ¶¶ 11-19, 44 P.3d at 1003-04).
- State v. Blythe Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Blythe Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Valentine Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Valentine Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- Midland v. Van Slyke Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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Midland v. Van Slyke
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
3 MIDLAND v. VAN SLYKE Decision of the Court ¶7 — a criminal case in which the defendant challenged the admission of evidence about transactions occurring on the murder victim’s Capital One account.
- State v. Barriga Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Barriga Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State of Arizona v. Ronald Vassell 359 P.3d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
- Cach v. Martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State of Arizona v. Ronald Vassell 359 P.3d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
- Cach v. Martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- Acarta v. Partridge Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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Acarta v. Partridge
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Cir. 1999); -02, ¶ 33 (2013) (stating that documents are admissible as adoptive business records when a business “regularly relies on the information that third parties submit as part of their ordinary course of business”.)
- State v. Mendiola Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Mendiola Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Alaniz-Silva Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Alaniz-Silva
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 78, (reviewing denial of motion to vacate judgment of guilt for abuse of discretion).
- State v. Ashmeade Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Ashmeade
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 38, (Confrontation Clause “bars admission of out of court testimonial evidence,” such as affidavits, “unless the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”).
- State of Arizona v. Johnathan Ian Burns 344 P.3d 303 Ariz. 2015
- State of Arizona v. Johnathan Ian Burns 344 P.3d 303 Ariz. 2015
- State of Arizona v. Craig A. Williamson 343 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
- State of Arizona v. Craig A. Williamson 343 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
- State v. Tomlin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Tomlin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Solis 339 P.3d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Solis
339 P.3d 668
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
¶ 44, (“[T]here must be evidence of flight from which can be inferred a consciousness of guilt for the crime charged.”) ( ).
- State v. Welch 340 P.3d 387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
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State v. Welch
340 P.3d 387
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
It is established that “[n]o Arizona case has required a third-party culpability instruction” because “the substance of the instruction [is] adequately covered” by the instructions “on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crimes charged.” ¶¶ 55-56
- State v. Jones Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Jones
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
But he never asked the trial court to delete the inapplicable language, and the court had “no duty to parse the proposed instruction for the accurate portions.” ¶ 54
- State v. Ramos 330 P.3d 987 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State v. Ramos 330 P.3d 987 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State v. Lockwood Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State v. Lockwood Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State of Arizona v. William Craig Miller 316 P.3d 1219 Ariz. 2013
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State of Arizona v. William Craig Miller
316 P.3d 1219
Ariz. 2013
¶8 “The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial protects a defendant’s right to be brought to trial without undue delay.” ¶ 9, see also U.S. Const. amend VI.
- Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona 314 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
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Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona
314 P.3d 814
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
¶¶ 9, 16, 62 (2013), quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
- State of Arizona v. Christian Betza Vasquez 311 P.3d 1115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
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State of Arizona v. Christian Betza Vasquez
311 P.3d 1115
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
In the video, Orel states his intention in granting the interview is to “clear everything out.” His words thus acknowledge a testimonial intent and reflect that he “‘would reasonably expect [his pretrial statements] to be used prosecutorially.’” -66 (2013), quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
- State of Arizona v. Amy Kay Gustafson 311 P.3d 258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
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State of Arizona v. Amy Kay Gustafson
311 P.3d 258
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
On a motion for a judgment of acquittal “‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, ¶ 70, (emphasis omitted), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
- State of Arizona v. Efren Medina 306 P.3d 48 Ariz. 2013
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State of Arizona v. Efren Medina
306 P.3d 48
Ariz. 2013
13 STATE V. MEDINA Opinion of the Court ¶54 “The Confrontation Clause bars admission of out of court testimonial evidence unless the defense has had an opportunity to cross- examine the declarant.” ¶ 38, (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).