Cited by

¶ 59 (2013) (quotation omitted).

P. 17.2(a); ¶ 13 (2013).

2 STATE v. CALDERA Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶6 We review the superior court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 8 (App. 2009), and “give[] deference to the trial court’s determination of relevance,” -14, ¶¶ 62-63 (2013).

We review for an abuse of discretion the admissibility of evidence, and review alleged constitutional violations de novo

See, e.g., Burns, 237 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 141 (“[A] family member’s brief remarks about the impact of remembering or visualizing a victim’s final moments were not unduly prejudicial.”); ¶ 57 (2013) (labeling a defendant as a “cop killer” was permissible); ¶¶ 69–71 (2012) (finding a statement describing the victims’ bodies as “mutilated” and “tortured” permissible); –94 ¶¶ 78, 82 (2018) (finding a victim’s statements that her “dau

¶113 However, the court abused its discretion in admitting the portions of the victim impact statements that characterized Montoya as “the worst kind of person” and a “bad guy” and the crime itself as “[s]imply gruesome” and “brutal.” Unlike previous factual statements that we have approved, ¶ 57 (2013) (finding victim impact statement referring to defendant as a “cop killer” permissible); Cota, 229 Ariz. at 150 ¶¶ 71–72 (finding victim impact statement referring to 42 STATE V. CHRISTOPHER MICHA

“We review a trial court’s 13 STATE v. FOURNIER Opinion of the Court determination of relevance and admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” ().

“Balancing of Rule 403 factors” is “a matter particularly and appropriately left to the trial court’s discretion,” ¶ 62 (2013), and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the superior court.

The superior court is afforded considerable discretion in determining whether proffered evidence is relevant and admissible, and Rule 403 balancing is “a matter particularly and appropriately left to [its] discretion.” ¶ 62 (2013).

“The [superior] court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb that ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 62 (2013).

¶ 73, 516 ¶ 75 (2013); see also Walker v. State, 707 So.

¶ 62 (2013); ¶ 29 (App. 2000)

–14 ¶¶ 63–65 (2013); Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 238 ¶¶ 28–30; Roque, 213 Ariz. at 222 ¶¶ 117–20.

“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” ¶ 62 (2013) ().

This “standard of relevance is not particularly high.” ¶ 52 (2013) (citation omitted).

She did not advocate for the death penalty, see State v. Carlson , , 397 ¶¶ 59-61, , 1095 (2015), and her statements are no more problematic than others this Court has found permissible, see, e.g. , Burns , 237 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 141, 344 P.3d at 332 (describing victim's final moments was "not unduly prejudicial"); State v. Rose , , 513 ¶ 57, , 919 (2013) (finding "cop killer" a permissible statement); State v. Cota , , 150 ¶¶ 69-72, , 1041 (2012) (describing the victims' bodies as "mutilated" and "t

¶ 62 (2013) (citation omitted).

¶ 13 (2013) ( ¶ 36 (1998)).

¶ 13 (2013) (citation omitted); Rule 17.1(b).