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The trial court found her to be credible, and we defer to this finding because “the trial court is ‘in the best position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it.’” ().

Although preclusion of evidence is an available remedy, it “is rarely an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation.” ¶ 30 (2014).

¶ 47 (2014) (holding that harsher sanctions are permissible "if the record demonstrates [the superior court] could have found lesser sanctions insufficient").

¶ 7 (2014) (“A knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights occurs when the suspect understands those rights and intends to waive them.”).

Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 On review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider only evidence presented at the suppression hearing, viewing that evidence “in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling.”

Because we cannot say that “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances,” ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)), we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Exhibits 957, 958, and 959.

We defer to the superior court on jury selection issues because the court is “in the best position to ‘assess the demeanor of the [jury panel], and of the individuals who compose it.’” ¶ 12 (2014) (citation omitted).

Upon review and consideration, Although this Court generally “defers ‘to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror,’” ¶ 19 (2014) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985)), the Arizona Supreme Court No. CR-24-0092-PR Page 2 of 3 trial court may only strike a juror for cause when the juror's views “would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of [the juror’s] duties [] in

I. BACKGROUND A. Naranjo’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ¶2 “A jury found [Naranjo] guilty of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced him to death.” ¶ 1 (2014).

–18 (1969); ¶ 7 (2014) (“A knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights occurs when the suspect understands those rights and intends to waive them.”).

The trial court abuses its discretion when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the 10 STATE v. CAWTHON Decision of the Court circumstances.” ¶ 29 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).

We likewise review a superior court’s ruling on sanctions for an untimely disclosure for an abuse of discretion and “will find an abuse of discretion only when no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 29 (2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The trial court abuses its discretion when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

¶ 64 (2014) (finding that improperly admitted other-acts evidence did not constitute fundamental, prejudicial error “[g]iven the nature and extent” of the other evidence presented).

“We must uphold a death sentence ‘if any reasonable juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’” ¶ 45 (2017) ( ¶ 89 (2014)).

The superior court abuses its discretion in ruling on a motion for a discovery sanction "only when 'no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.'" ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

Imposition of the death sentence ¶194 We will uphold the jury’s death verdict “if any reasonable juror could conclude that the mitigation presented was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” ¶ 89 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).