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To assess prejudice, the court considers the interests the speedy trial right protects including: “(1) preventing ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration,’ (2) minimizing ‘anxiety and concern of the accused,’ and (3) limiting ‘the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’” ¶ 12 (2013) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532); accord Parker, 231 Ariz. at 399 ¶ 16.

¶10 “To determine whether a mistrial is warranted, courts consider ‘(1) whether the jury has heard what it should not hear, and (2) the probability that what it heard influenced [it].’” ¶ 25 (2013) (citation omitted); accord Bailey, 160 Ariz. at 279.

Mistrials are “the most dramatic remedy for trial error,” and the court should only grant a party’s request for a mistrial if “the interests of justice will be thwarted otherwise.” ¶ 25 (2013) (quotation omitted).

But “we assess the legal adequacy of the instructions de novo, viewing them in their entirety.” ¶ 116 (2020) ( ¶ 41 (2013)).

¶ 48 (2012); ¶ 18 (2013), Allen, 253 Ariz. at 310, ¶ 62.

This Court reviews the superior court’s refusal to strike a juror for an abuse of discretion, State v. Montoya, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶ 72, which requires this Court to “determine whether substantial evidence supports” the court’s decision, ¶ 51 (2013) (quotation omitted).

See State v. (William C.) Miller, ¶ 53 (2013) (“We have repeatedly found the motivational relationship requirement satisfied when evidence suggested that a defendant killed others in the vicinity to eliminate witnesses.”).

¶¶ 3, 17 (2013) (after separately asking four men to murder five people, defendant committed requested murders himself two months later); ¶¶ 2, 47 (2012) (series of random drive-by shootings in Phoenix area from June 2005 to August 2006); 609 (App.

"To determine whether a mistrial is warranted, courts consider '(1) whether the jury has heard what it should not hear, and (2) the probability that what it heard influenced [it].'" ¶ 25 (2013) () (alterations in original).

¶31 To that end, Daniel argues the superior court “committed an error of law” by failing to declare a mistrial because it had “already deemed the personal information to be unduly prejudicial.” Although we generally “review the denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion,” ¶ 23 (2013), Daniel asserts that because “the trial judge failed to enforce his own pretrial rulings[,] [t]he trial court is not entitled to any deference regarding this issue.” Daniel cites no authority to support

¶4 Over a five-day span, Miller presented “a good deal of mitigation, including evidence that he suffered from Bipolar Disorder I; exhibited troubling behaviors as a child; had a family history of emotional difficulties, drug abuse, and alcohol problems; and had experienced difficulty controlling his impulses throughout his life.” ¶ 63 (2013).

In deciding whether a mistrial is warranted, courts examine “(1) whether 6 STATE v. VOGE Decision of the Court the jury has heard what it should not hear, and (2) the probability that what it heard influenced [it].” ¶ 25 (2013).

“‘We review a trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion,’ but we assess the legal adequacy of the instructions de novo, viewing them in their entirety.” ¶ 41 (2013) (quoting Garcia, 224 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 75).

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1; -37, ¶ 8 (2013); (finding a nine-month delay sufficient to conduct the full Barker analysis).

We previously addressed the (F)(12) aggravator in State v. Miller, where the defendant “made several statements that he wanted to kill [the victims] because of their cooperation with the arson investigation,” and where “[h]e began planning and taking steps to carry out the murders shortly after he was indicted for arson.” ¶ 56 (2013).

passim (2013) (finding no fundamental error based on multiple factors, including defense counsel’s professed “strategic choice” not to object to inadmissible testimony); Gendron, 168 Ariz. at 155 (emphasizing the limited circumstances in which fundamental error occurs and noting that “[a] claim of fundamental error

¶18 Moreover, to challenge the denial of a severance, a defendant “must demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial court was unable to protect.” ¶ 18 (2013).

9 STATE v. SILVA Decision of the Court ¶ 25 (2013) (“[W]hen a witness unexpectedly volunteers an inadmissible statement, the action called for rests largely within the discretion of the trial court .

¶ 18 (2013); Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 446, ¶ 67 (defendant could not demonstrate prejudice because court instructed jurors to consider each charged offense separately, and we “presume jurors follow the court’s instructions”); ¶ 13 (2006) (any possible prejudice from joinder was