Cited by

See § 13- 2921 (requiring that harassment be “knowingly and repeatedly” committed); (noting defendant’s subjective motive differs from statutory element of “knowingly”).

We start with the statute’s text “because it is the most reliable indicator of a statute’s meaning.” ¶ 11 (2016).

also extends, at least within constitutional bounds, to defenses.” ¶ 9 (2016); ¶ 13 (App. 2012) (“Defenses to criminal charges under Arizona law are statutory.”) (citing A.R.S.

(“The legislature is empowered to define what constitutes a crime in this state and to prescribe the punishment for criminal offenses.”).

§§ 13-1401 (2015), - 1407(E) (2008); ¶ 1 (2016).

¶ 8 (2016); ¶ 18 (App. 2012).

¶¶ 17–18 (2016) (declining to infer that sexual motivation is an element in child molestation and sexual abuse offenses because, in part, the plain language of the underlying statute does “not mention, imply, or require sexual motivation”).

¶ 19 (2016) (“[T]he [pre-2018 amendment] statutory scheme clearly and unambiguously identifies the elements of .

¶ 47 (2016) ( ¶ 18 (2011)).

-10, ¶¶ 38-40, 45-47 (2016).

¶ 40 (2016) (“Treating lack of sexual motivation under [A.R.S.]

If a defendant offers “some evidence” that the conduct underlying the alleged offense was justified under § 13-411, the State “bears the burden of proving ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with justification.’” ¶ 21 (2016) (quoting A.R.S.

Sexual motivation is not an element of the attempted offense, ¶ 34 (2016), and the court made no finding of sexual motivation under § 13-118.

¶5 When Caime committed the attempted child molestation offenses at issue in this case, the State was not required to “prove as an element of those crimes that [the] defendant’s conduct was motivated by a sexual interest.” ¶ 1 (2016).

–10, ¶¶ 38–40, 45– 7 STATE v. GARCIA Decision of the Court 46 (2016).

505, 506–07 (9th Cir. 2019), Bieganski contends that Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 13-1401, -1410, and -1407(E) (collectively, “child molestation statutes”) were unconstitutional 1 and urges us to reconsider our supreme court’s decision in State v. Holle (“Holle II”)