Cited by

–85, ¶ 50 (2020) (gauging reliability of a pretrial identification based on factors including the witness’s degree of attention and opportunity to view the defendant, the accuracy of the witness’s description, and the witness’s initial level of certainty) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972)).

They may, however, “summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.” ¶ 144 (2020) (citation omitted).

When determining whether closing arguments constitute prosecutorial error, we consider whether the remarks “called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision” and “the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 144 (2020).

During closing arguments, the prosecutor may “summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.” ¶ 144 (2020) (citation omitted).

¶ 62 (2020) (we defer to the court’s assessment of a prosecutor’s credibility).

But “we assess the legal adequacy of the instructions de novo, viewing them in their entirety.” ¶ 116 (2020) ( ¶ 41 (2013)).

During closing arguments, the prosecutor may “summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.” ¶ 144 (2020) ( ¶ 196 (2016)).

¶ 81 (2020) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a video without watching it).

¶107 Our supreme court’s cases, by contrast, describe an unfair trial as one in which “the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict.” Robinson, (describing standard in fundamental-error case).

See, –92 ¶¶ 95–98 (2020) (reviewing trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 19.1(d) for fundamental error); –05 ¶¶ 7–12 (2011) (reviewing trial court’s failure to comply with A.R.S.

¶15 We review a court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 16 (2020), and consider “only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing .

¶ 106 n.6 (2020) (acknowledging amendment of (F)(5) but the former “version of the pecuniary gain statute applie[d]” in case where jury also found state proved (F)(2) serious offense aggravating circumstance); Thompson, 252 Ariz. at 289 ¶ 16 n.4 (2022) (acknowledging amendments but citing “the version of § 13-751

During the penalty phase of a capital trial, a defendant may present, and the jury must consider, any relevant mitigation factors including “any aspect of the defendant’s character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.” § 13-751(G); ¶ 118 (2020).

Further, the court “has discretion to determine whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues.” ¶ 76 (2020).

A claim of prosecutorial error requires the defendant to show error occurred and there is a “reasonable likelihood” the error “could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 138 (2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

-81, ¶¶ 21-22 (2020); State v. Collins, 1 CA- CR 19-0201, 2020 WL 5523189 (Ariz. App. Sept.

Escalante, and we afford great deference to trial court findings in this context, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (“Since the trial judge’s findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.”); ¶ 62 (2020) (to similar effect).