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See Preston, 1 CA-CR 21-0138, at *2 ¶ 14; –34 ¶¶ 19–21 (2020) (holding the mere absence of DNA tends not to exonerate the defendant because the defendant “may not have left identifiable DNA” even if they committed the crime).

§ 13-4240(B)(1); –34 ¶¶ 20–21 (2020) (holding that uncollected DNA evidence did not tend to exonerate the defendant where the evidence would only either “match [the defendant], definitively confirming he was the [offender]” or “not match [the defendant], which would not conclusively exculpate him because he may not have left identi

(concluding that the destruction of a videotape did not prejudice the defendant where an eyewitness unequivocally identified the defendant as the perpetrator and the defendant offered no proof that the tape "would have proven his mistaken identity defense"); –34, 10 STATE v. ROYALTY Decision of the Court ¶ 20 (2020) (explaining that a defendant must offer more than speculation about how lost or destroyed evidence could have had a tendency to exonerate him).

n claims he offered to speak with the police, but they declined his offer, and the police’s “one and only action in [the] case was to ‘set up’ a confrontation call.” But the State “‘does not have an affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence,’ nor does it have a duty to gather evidence for a defendant to use in establishing a defense.” ¶ 11 (2020) ().

¶8 If the State “fails to preserve obviously material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused and prejudice results, the trial court must provide the jury a Willits instruction.” ¶ 1 (2020); see also Willits, 96 Ariz. at 191; ¶ 7 (2014).

¶12 “Generally, a defendant is entitled to a Willits instruction if: (1) the state failed to preserve obviously material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused; and (2) there was resulting prejudice.” ¶ 10 (2020).