Cited by

¶207 Indeed, in State v. Amaya-Ruiz, we were “able to address the 21 arguments submitted by defendant under 11 issues, reflecting our belief that the brief could have withstood further editing without compromising the quality of its arguments.” (stating that the court’s page limits do not infringe due process rights).

¶8 “The granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will only be disturbed upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion and prejudice to [the] defendant.” (citations omitted).

own confession proved the elements of all the crimes charged”); (“[W]e have no difficulty concluding beyond a reasonable doubt by reason of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, including, most importantly, his own uncoerced confession, that the jury would have found him guilty without the [challenged evidence].”)

“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” ¶ 62 (2013) ().

4 The three and a half years’ imprisonment runs consecutively with Counts 1, 3, and 4.

“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” (citation omitted).3 2 Gallardo’s statement to police, relaying a statement he heard Brown say during the altercation, is hearsay within hearsay.

¶ 14 (2010) (“The polygrapher’s request that Villalobos tell the truth to ‘get out of this hole’ was also permissible.”); (“Mere advice from the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.”).

Specifically, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor’s statements that defense counsel “‘blind sided’ witnesses,” created a “smoke screen,” and “relied on ‘innuendo and inference’ to support her theory” or “outrageous argument” was “not improper.”

at 86 ¶ 59; see also State v. Lynch (Lynch II), –97 ¶¶ 28–29 (2015) (illustrating improper commentary towards counsel as suggesting defense counsel fabricated evidence), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); – 72 (1990) (no error where prosecutor referred to defense as “smoke screen”).

3 STATE v. SCROGGINS Decision of the Court ¶7 Further, “[t]he granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will only be disturbed upon a showing of a clear abuse of such discretion and prejudice to defendant.”

(a defendant has a due process “right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent”) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)).

(addressing competency).

See, ¶ 29 (2015) (citations omitted) (finding prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that defense theories were not credible was not misconduct), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); (finding the characterization of defense as “outrageous” and a “smoke screen” permissible); Ramos, 235 Ariz. at 237- 38, ¶¶ 24-25 (holding there was no misconduct where prosecutor suggested defense counsel was attempting to divert jurors by raising distractions or “red herrings”).

(prosecutor’s closing argument that characterized defense questions as a “ploy,” “outrageous,” and “improper” was “well within the wide latitude afforded” during closing argument) n. 7, ¶ 30 (1998); (prosecutor’s characterization of defense as a “smoke screen” not improper).

¶12 “A defendant has a due process ‘right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent.’” ¶ 13 (2010) (); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992)) (same).