Cited by

–60 (1983) (defendant must be present to exercise allocution); (allocution is a protected right); (sentencing is a “critical stage of the proceedings”); (defendant has right to be present at oral sentencing).

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1986); (“[A] confession is involuntary only if it results from coercive activity by the state.”); (defendant must show “coercive police conduct, rather than internal compulsion, induced his confession”).

The court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of the information nor by allowing counsel to strategically “draw the sting.” (“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”).

A trial court “has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence.”

Such grounds exist if “there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the defendant is not able to understand the nature of the proceeding against him and to assist in his defense.” ().

¶30 A photograph “is relevant if it aids the jury in understanding any issue in dispute.”

Likewise, “[m]ere advice from the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.” ¶ 29 (2003) (“Mere advice that it would be better to be truthful is a permissible interrogation tactic.”); Huerstel, ¶ 55 (2003) (“[S]uch advice [to tell the truth] from the police when unaccompanied by either a threat or promise does not r

¶6 Although the trial court is “under a continuing duty to inquire into a defendant’s competency, and to order a [Rule] 112 examination sua sponte if reasonable grounds exist,” courts generally assume that “a criminal defendant has sufficient mental competence to stand trial.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 174 (2008).

STATE v. BLOMDAHL Decision of the Court 162 (1990) (the superior court has broad discretion in determining whether to order competency hearings).

–72 (1990) (finding a prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel “blind sided” witnesses, used “innuendo and inference,” made an “outrageous” argument, and accused witnesses were “not improper .

-72 (1990) (finding no error in prosecutor calling the defense a “smoke screen” and commenting that 12 STATE v. ANDERSON Decision of the Court defense counsel “blind sided witnesses,” used “innuendo and inference,” and m

“The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether reasonable grounds exist to order a competency hearing and its decision will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”

(citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181-82 (1975)).

(“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”).

See Hulsey, 243 Ariz. at 390 ¶ 99 (finding that a prosecutor’s comments equating defense counsel to Don Quixote improperly impugned counsel’s integrity); –72 (1990) (finding a prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel “blind sided witnesses,” used “innuendo and inference,” made an “outrageous” argument, and accused witnesses were “not improper .

("[W]hen a defendant is convicted of first degree murder rather than second degree murder, any error as to instructions on lesser included offenses is necessarily harmless, because the jury has necessarily rejected all lesser- included crimes."); ("[B]y fi

In an analogous case, State v. Amaya-Ruiz, the prosecutor argued the defense theory that multiple law enforcement agencies conspired to frame the defendant was a “smoke screen” and “outrageous.”

(concluding witness’ opinions of similarity between footprint and defendant’s shoe were harmless because the jury could compare the print and shoe for themselves).

(quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)).