Cited by

The competency inquiry thus focuses “on an extremely narrow issue: whether whatever is afflicting the defendant has so affected his present capacity that he is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings or to assist his counsel in conducting his defense.” STATE v. YOUNG Decision of the Court 1260, 1270 (1990) (

court has held that a prosecutor arguing certain questions by defense counsel were “‘a defense ploy,’ ‘improper,’ and ‘outrageous’” is “well within the latitude afforded both parties in closing argument.” n.7, n.7 (1998); –72, –80 (1990) (finding that prosecutor’s arguments that defense counsel “blind-sided witnesses,” created a “smoke screen,” and relied on “innuendo and inference” to support her “outrageous” argument was “not improper .

¶ 7 The municipal court “has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence.”

(erroneous jury instruction not harmless error if defendant could be convicted without proof beyond reasonable doubt of requisite culpable mental state).

Accordingly, we review Andrus’s hearsay argument for abuse of discretion, but we review his Confrontation Clause argument only for fundamental, prejudicial error.

-72, -80 (1990) (prosecutor's arguments that defense counsel "blind-sided witnesses," created a "smoke screen," and relied on "innuendo and inference" to support her "outrageous" argument was "not improper .

1 We reject Jarrett’s assertion that the expert’s testimony about the effect of methamphetamine was relevant because Jarrett made no offer of proof about the methamphetamine’s effect, and neither does the record otherwise indicate what the testimony would have been regarding the

(“The granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will only be disturbed upon a showing of a clear abuse of such discretion and prejudice to defendant.”).

There is no comparable statutory provision, however, referencing the culpable mental state of “knowingly.” ¶15 Although there is not a statutory basis for a transferred mental state instruction regarding “knowing” conduct, the Arizona Supreme Court suggested that such an instruction might be appropriate in certain instances.

“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”

¶9 “Due process requires that the state ‘observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent.’” (citation omitted).

¶12 “The trial court has discretion to decide whether to admit photographs, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”

¶62 “The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”

(state’s burden); ¶¶ 32, 34, 38, -30 (App. 2002) (affirming trial court when state did not adequately develop record at suppression hearing).

Ariz. 72, 85, ¶ 59 , (noting that “[ejounsel can argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.”); , (recognizing that counsel may “summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.”); , (stating that counsel is given “wide latitude” in closing arguments to comment on the evidence).

“The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” , , (allowing the trial court considerable discretion in determining relevancy and admissibility of evidence).