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Withdrawal from a plea agreement is “allowed only when it may fairly be said that the deal was not voluntary because defendant lacked information of true importance in the decision-making process.” overruled in part on other grounds by E.H.

Instead, “[w]hen the defendant claims his plea was unknowing and therefore involuntary, the question is not simply what the defendant was told in court but what he knew from any source.” overruled in part on other grounds by E.H.

There is no constitutional requirement to inform a defendant of a specific amount of restitution or to cap the amount of restitution that a court may order, for that proposition.

P. 17.1(b); -96 (1990) (“A plea will be found involuntary [] where a defendant lacks information of ‘true importance in the decision- making process.’” ()); (finding a plea was not involuntary where it was based on the defendant’s “honest misunderstanding” or “mistaken subjective impressions” that were not “reasonably justified”).

In support of the caps, and State v. Lukens, 151 2 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current version of a statute or rule.

A plea will be found involuntary only where a defendant lacks information of “true importance in the decision- making process.” –96 (1990) ().

Remand for Evidentiary Hearing ¶8 When a court fails to inform a defendant by colloquy of each constitutional right he or she will be forfeiting, the proper remedy is to remand to the court to determine whether the defendant “would have agreed to submit her case to the judge if a proper colloquy had been conducted.” Bunting, 226 Ariz. at 577, ¶ 11; (“When the defendant claims his plea was unknowing and therefore involuntary, the question is not simply what the defendant was told in court but wha

“A plea will be found involuntary only where a defendant lacks information of ‘true importance in the decision-making process.’” -96, -05 (1990) ( ).

But “[a] plea will be found involuntary only where a defendant lacks information of ‘true importance in the decision-making process.’” -96, -05 (1990)

dant lacks information of ‘true importance in the decision-making process.’” -96, -05 (1990) (court’s failure to inform defendant of ineligibility for earned 4 release credits did not render plea involuntary where defendant informed of earliest parole eligibility date), -82, -81 (1987) (court’s failure to advise defendant of restitution amount might not warrant rescission of plea).

(quoting State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477, 483, (Moeller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

See, -82 , -81 (1987) (concluding ease challenging plea’s validity could not be decided without “original evidence” and remanding to trial court for evidentiary hearing).

at 475 , 949 P.2d at 564 ( , ); ¶¶ 36-37 , (where State and defendant agreed that defendant’s admission to a prior conviction did not comply with Rule 17, sentence remanded for a “hearing to determine whether defendant knew from any source the

¶ 17 A voluntary plea is one made “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” , (emphasis in original) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct.

(defendant must show that restitution amount was actually relevant to decision to plead in potential capital ease); , (defendant failed to show that prosecutor’s promise not to recommend consecutive sentences was material

“[T]he question is not simply what the defendant was told in court but what he knew from any source.” , (guilty plea).

we specifically condemned the practice of raising an issue concerning a plea agreement for the first time on appeal.

In revisiting this issue, we are “mindful that precedents of the court should hot lightly be overruled and certainly not for reasons so inconsequential as a change of personnel on the court.” , (Moeller, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

(defendant must show missing information actually relevant to decision-making process; where not “of the essence” of the agreement, plea will not be vacated)

(voluntariness of plea).

( , (Moeller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

we specifically condemned the practice of raising an issue concerning a plea agreement for the first time on appeal.

In doing so, we are “mindful that precedents of the court should not lightly be overruled and certainly not for reasons so inconsequential as a change of personnel on the court.” State *417 v. Crowder, , (Moeller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).