Cited by

(“We have often emphasized that the statutory expression of ‘especially heinous, cruel, or depraved’ is phrased in the disjunctive, hence a finding of any one of those three factors suffices to constitute an aggravating circumstance.” (internal citation omitted)).

¶ 27 (2001); overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002).

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

(“A witness’[s] ability to perceive or recall critical facts is highly relevant to his credibility.”).

(“It is well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.”)

(quotation omitted); (noting where jury instructions “are ‘substantially free from error,’ the defendant suffers no prejudice by their wording.”) ().

(recognizing the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a mistrial), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).

(holding that because the defendant "stipulated to the foundation for admitting [a] gun into evidence .

(finding that statements such as “[i]t’s nothing that can’t be worked out” and “to lie isn’t going to help .

It is, however, “well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.” (citations omitted); (“The decision to permit counsel to call a witness who has indicated he or she will refuse to testify is ordinarily discretionary with the trial court, which must determine whether the interest of the person calling the witness outw

¶¶ 27, 29 (2003); (finding that statements such as “[i]t’s nothing that can’t be worked out” and “to lie isn’t going to help” were the detective’s opinions and not an express or implied promise).

4 -94, -40 (1989) (Feldman, J., concurring).

(trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing based on generalized and unsubstantiated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); (ineffective assistance of counsel must be a demonstrable reality rather than a matter of speculation), (defendant’s self-serving assertions in affidavit are generally insufficient to raise a colorable Rule 32 claim); see also Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997) (an alleged failure to investigate does not meet the prejudice prong when de

-94, -40 (1989) (Feldman, J., concurring).

(“First, speculation about ‘potential confusion among jurors’ is insufficient to establish actual jury confusion.”).

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct.

A trial court’s denial of a mistrial will be reversed only if it is “palpably improper and clearly injurious.” ( ).

( aff’d, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., -87, -18 (2000) (defense counsel who purposely did not object to expert witness’ qualifications or the foundation for his opinions during testimony waived those legal objections); (Defendant who stipulated to foundation for admission of murder weapon could not later complain of insufficient foundation.), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); -45, -30

d on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1988) (distinguishing vagueness 4 These cases largely predate the later line of capital cases, issued by our state supreme court on the same topic, that provide a narrower construction for the meaning of the phrase “cruel, heinous, or depraved.” -87, -33 (1989) (cruelty depends on victim’s experience before death and whether defendant intended or reasonably could foresee victim’s suf

7 either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.”); (finding statements by detective that defendant needed to tell the truth to “give yourself a chance” not coercive).

ewise, McKenna made no offer of proof of what actual evidence he would have presented about whether J. was a drug dealer, the amount of cocaine in J.’s body, and what effects such an amount might have had on J. See, -14 , -81 (1996) (ruling affirmed based on “sparse record” because defendant made no specific offer of proof); -82 , -28 (1989) 7 (affirming preclusion of evidence where defendant, failed to make offer of proof “beyond bare speculation” about how drug-use history could have impaired