Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017.

173 citing documents.

  • Ritchie v. Krasner 211 P.3d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
    [Dr. Solomon] in is because these two [defendants] named her as a non-party at fault.” ¶ 54 Courts give counsel “ ‘wide latitude’ in closing arguments to ‘comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences’ from it.” ¶ 180 , ( , ( , *304 (1989))).
  • State v. Williams 99 P.3d 43 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • State v. Williams 99 P.3d 43 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • State v. Patterson 56 P.3d 1097 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • State v. Patterson 56 P.3d 1097 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
    (finding no error in reopening after closing arguments but prior to jury deliberations); , -61 (1962) (same).
  • State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
    It must be the intent preceding the mortal blow, not “what surprisingly transpired” afterward, that “guides our analysis.”
  • State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
    See, , (defendant cut victims several times before stabbing them, and one of the victims saw his own mother stabbed in the back prior to murder); , (defendant drove victim to desert, forced victim to lie on ground while captors debated victim’s fate); , (armed defendants broke into victims’ home, victims listened while defendant shot family members and waited for their turn).
  • State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
    -09 , -32 (1996) (financial gain as impetus for homicide); Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 513 , 892 P.2d at 849 ; , (“[T]he purpose of the killing must be to further the defendant’s motive of pecuniary gain....
  • State v. Bass 12 P.3d 796 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Bass 12 P.3d 796 Ariz. 2000
    There is no evidence that the jury was misled, and “[m]ere speculation that the jury was confused is insufficient to establish actual jury confusion.” Gallegos, 178 Ariz. at 11 , 870 P.2d at 1107 ( , ).
  • State v. Smith 974 P.2d 431 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Smith 974 P.2d 431 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Pettit 979 P.2d 5 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Pettit 979 P.2d 5 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    (fact that several months had passed between alleged promise and defendant’s statement contradicted reliance); -80 , -26 (1989), aff'd 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Ebert 964 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Ebert 964 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Djerf 959 P.2d 1274 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Djerf 959 P.2d 1274 Ariz. 1998
    See, -32 , -50 (1996) (age sixteen not mitigating factor); , (age twenty not mitigating factor); -61 , -06 (1985) (age nineteen not mitigating factor).
  • State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Rienhardt 951 P.2d 454 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
    -80 , -26 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Rienhardt 951 P.2d 454 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Schackart 947 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Schackart 947 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Shone 945 P.2d 834 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Shone 945 P.2d 834 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    -81 , -27 (1989) (objections to the impanelling of the jury are waived unless made during voir dire), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
    2052, 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); -92 , -38 (1989), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Detrich 932 P.2d 1328 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Detrich 932 P.2d 1328 Ariz. 1997
    (holding that defendant “cannot object to the [jury] panel once he has approved it”) (citations omitted), affd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Lacy 929 P.2d 1288 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Lacy 929 P.2d 1288 Ariz. 1996
    -80 , -26 (1989), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
    aff'd 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Dickens 926 P.2d 468 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Dickens 926 P.2d 468 Ariz. 1996
    aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Laird 920 P.2d 769 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Laird 920 P.2d 769 Ariz. 1996
    It is obvious that she suffered great physical and emotional pain, and thus the murder was “especially cruel.” , (cruelty can consist of physical abuse or mental anguish, including victim’s uncertainty as to her ultimate fate), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
    a. Cruelty Cruelty focuses on the victim’s state of mind and exists when the defendant “inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim’s death.”
  • State v. Gallegos 916 P.2d 1056 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Miles 918 P.2d 1028 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Jackson 918 P.2d 1038 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Jackson 918 P.2d 1038 Ariz. 1996
    aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct.
  • State v. Miles 918 P.2d 1028 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Gallegos 916 P.2d 1056 Ariz. 1996
    3047, 3056-58 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)
  • State v. Roscoe 910 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996