Cited by

( and citing State v. Lee, 608, 616 (1997)).

“We will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence without a ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.” -43, ¶ 57, -13 (2000) ( ).

The misconduct must be “‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 26 ( and citing Lee, 189 Ariz. at 616).

(finding no prejudice where half of the jurors had “minimal” media exposure, but indicated it would not interfere with their ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors); cf. Payne, 233 Ariz. at 500, ¶ 32 (finding no prejudice to defendant in the denial of a request to change venue where seven of twelve

(“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’”) (quoting United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Blevins, 555 F.2d 1236, 1240 (5th Cir.

“‘Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” Id., P.3d 717 (2001).

¶ 17, (noting that because father did not establish prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, “we need not determine whether Arizona recognizes ineffective assistance of counsel as a separate ground for relief in an appeal of a termination order or resolves an allegation of counsel’s inadequacies as a due process claim”); (“If an ineffectiveness claim can be rejected for lack of prejudice, the court need not inquire into counsel’s performance.”).

– 18 (1992) ( United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986) (explaining that a jury’s guilty verdict makes any error in its charging decision harmless).

We presume a sentencing court considered any mitigating evidence presented, and we leave to the court’s sound discretion how much weight to give any such evidence

“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” (quoting United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. 7 STATE v. GIRON Decision of the Court Blevins, 555 F.2d 1236, 1240 (5th Cir. 1977)); s

The exclusion of the public, therefore, “is an extraordinary measure and should be done with caution[,]” ( ) opinion modified on denial of reconsideration (July 10, 1992) P.3d 717 (2001), especially when requested by a defendant and “would take from the pub

(holding “trial court has broad discretion in evidentiary matters”), ¶ 25, Dozier, 1 CA-CR 05-0463 at ¶¶ 35-40 (holding no abuse of discretion in excluding third-party culpability evidence).

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion, id., and reverse only where there is a “’reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the [improper] evidence not been admitted.” –43, ¶ 57, –13 (2000) ( ).

¶ 31, (citations omitted) (defendant waives Batson challenges by failing to object at trial; (concluding that the court could not determine whether an identifiable underrepresentation is the result of systematic exclusion because the defendant did not provide information 5 STATE v. BROWN

at 157 ¶ 15, 181 P.3d at 204 ( ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶13 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must establish that “‘(1) misconduct is indeed present[,] and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.’” -83 (2005)

To show presumed prejudice, a defendant must show that the publicity “was so extensive or outrageous that it permeated the proceedings or created a carnival-like atmosphere.” ¶ 14, (internal quotation marks omitted) ( ).

-46 n.21(4), -63 n.21(4) (1992).

-46 n.21(4), -63 n.21(4) (1992).

-46 n. 21(4), -63 n. 21(4) (1992).