Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593.

512 citing documents.

State v. Bigger 254 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Media coverage must be so “extensive or outrageous that it permeated the proceedings or created a ‘carnival-like’ atmosphere.” Cruz, , 181 P.3d at 204
State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
State v. Gallardo 242 P.3d 159 Ariz. 2010
State v. Gallardo 242 P.3d 159 Ariz. 2010
¶40 Even if the comments by the prosecutor were improper, we would reverse only if Gallardo established “a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the ‘misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict.’” Newell, 212 Ariz. at 403 ¶ 67, 132 P.3d at 847 ( ¶ 25, ).
State v. Snelling 236 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2010
State v. Snelling 236 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2010
(noting that “[w]e will not speculate on appeal about ‘what might have been’ or ‘what could have happened’”), ¶ 25
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
¶12 Garcia argues that even in the absence of state action, the trial court should have analyzed the reliability of Anderson’s (stating that “unnecessarily suggestive government identification procedures are [not] the sine qua non of due process concerns”).
State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
at 157, ¶ 15, 181 P.3d at 204 ( ); (“Although many cases discuss the doctrine, very few cases have actually presumed prejudice due to a carnival or circus atmosphere at trial.”).
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 645-46 n.21(4), -63 n.21(4) (1992).
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
State v. Maldonado 219 P.3d 1050 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Maldonado 219 P.3d 1050 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State of Arizona v. Shawn De Nean Edmisten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State of Arizona v. Shawn De Nean Edmisten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
We will not reverse a conviction because of a prosecutor’s improper comments during closing argument unless there is a “‘reasonable likelihood’ that the ‘misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict.’”
State of Arizona v. Flythe 193 P.3d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Flythe 193 P.3d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
(defendant waived issue by failing to renew motion to sever count)
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
- 4 - “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the publicity attendant to defendant’s trial was so pervasive that it caused the proceedings to be fundamentally unfair.” ¶ 13, ( ).
John M. v. Ades, Shannon M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
John M. v. Ades, Shannon M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
(in criminal case, “[i]f an ineffectiveness claim can be rejected for lack of prejudice, the court need not inquire into counsel’s performance”).
STATE OF ARIZONA v. THOMAS GREG McCURDY Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
STATE OF ARIZONA v. THOMAS GREG McCURDY Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State v. Velazquez 166 P.3d 91 Ariz. 2007
State v. Velazquez 166 P.3d 91 Ariz. 2007
-46 n.21(4), -63 n.21(4) (1992), P.3d 717 (2001).
State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
State v. Morris 160 P.3d 203 Ariz. 2007
State v. Morris 160 P.3d 203 Ariz. 2007
State of Arizona v. Cesar Francisco Rubiano 150 P.3d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Cesar Francisco Rubiano 150 P.3d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State 5 v. Atwood, (“In Arizona, the prosecution must establish a reasonable inference of the corpus delicti before it may introduce defendant’s extrajudicial confession or admission as additional evidence of the crime.”).
State v. Price 145 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
State v. Price 145 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
(finding no error when the trial court determined that the witnesses’ identification of defendant was reliable under the totality of the circumstances).
State v. Ellison 140 P.3d 899 Ariz. 2006
State v. Ellison 140 P.3d 899 Ariz. 2006
State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 645-46 n.21, -63 n.21 (1992), P.3d 717 (2001).
State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
“[A] defendant is not prejudiced by a denial of severance where the jury is instructed to consider each offense separately and advised that each must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 17, ( ).
State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006
State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
ense charged, or in this case to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances, a defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”), overruled on other grounds by Ring II, 536 U.S. 586-87; (“Placing the burden on the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances is not a violation of due process.”), ¶ 25
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
We “will reverse [a] defendant’s conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct if two conditions are satisfied: (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” , *341 , 241 ¶ 25, , 79 ¶ 26
State v. Murdaugh 97 P.3d 844 Ariz. 2004
State v. Murdaugh 97 P.3d 844 Ariz. 2004
State of Arizona v. Max Valencia Chavez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004