Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593.

512 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Max Valencia Chavez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
¶15 As a corollary of that general principle, and given the exclusionary rule’s primary purpose, which is to discourage unconstitutional conduct by police, (Corcoran, J., specially concurring); courts have refused to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through the unlawful actions of private citizens.
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
¶ 145 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” , ¶ 25
State v. Garfield 92 P.3d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Garfield 92 P.3d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
¶ 6 When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we do not “reevaluat[e] the evidence to determine whether we would have convicted [the] defendant.”
State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
We determine whether “under the totality of the circumstances the publicity attendant to defendant’s trial was so pervasive that it caused the proceeding to be fundamentally unfair.” (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975)), ¶ 25
State of Arizona v. Christina Marie George Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. Christina Marie George Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
State v. Dann 74 P.3d 231 Ariz. 2003
State v. Dann 74 P.3d 231 Ariz. 2003
404(b), courts “will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence” unless there is a “ ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.” -43, ¶ 57 , -13 (2000) ( , ).
State v. Sullivan 69 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Sullivan 69 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(“The test for determining harmless error is ‘whether there was reasonable probability ...
State v. Rutledge 66 P.3d 50 Ariz. 2003
State v. Rutledge 66 P.3d 50 Ariz. 2003
State v. Blakley 65 P.3d 77 Ariz. 2003
State v. Blakley 65 P.3d 77 Ariz. 2003
Our task is to determine “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the publicity attendant to defendant’s trial was so pervasive that it caused the proceedings to be fundamentally unfair.” , (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 , 95 S.Ct.
State v. Hall 65 P.3d 90 Ariz. 2003
State v. Hall 65 P.3d 90 Ariz. 2003
State v. Montaño 65 P.3d 61 Ariz. 2003
State v. Montaño 65 P.3d 61 Ariz. 2003
t levies a handful of charges against the state and contends that they demonstrate “the prosecution failed to act in good faith in this case.” To prove prosecutorial misconduct, the appellant must show: (1) the state’s actions were improper; and (2) “a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.”
State v. Prince 61 P.3d 450 Ariz. 2003
State v. Prince 61 P.3d 450 Ariz. 2003
we held that a defendant is not prejudiced by a denial of severance where the jury is instructed to consider each offense separately and advised that each must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Minnitt 55 P.3d 774 Ariz. 2002
State v. Minnitt 55 P.3d 774 Ariz. 2002
Tornabene v. Bonine Ex Rel. Arizona Highway Department 54 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Tornabene v. Bonine Ex Rel. Arizona Highway Department 54 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
1974), Whether to apply that rule to a particular fact situation requires “weighting] the benefits of vindicating a constitutional right through the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule against the possibility that other deterrents may exist which would accomplish the same result at less cost to society.” , , (J. Corcoran, specially concurring).
State v. Prion 52 P.3d 189 Ariz. 2002
State v. Prion 52 P.3d 189 Ariz. 2002
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
dice based on pretrial publicity, a defendant must establish that the publicity manipulated the jurors or otherwise distracted them from their duty to decide the case based solely on the evidence presented, making the trial little more than a “mockery of justice or a mere formality.” Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 513 , 898 P.2d at 462 (quoting Bible, 175 Ariz. at 563 , 858 P.2d at 1166 ; , , 241 ¶ 25, , 729 ¶ 25 (2001)).
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
645-46 n. 21, , 662-63 n. 21 (1992), , , 729 ¶ 25 (2001).
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
-46 n.21, -63 n.21 (1992), ¶25 (2001).
State v. Spreitz 39 P.3d 525 Ariz. 2002
State v. Spreitz 39 P.3d 525 Ariz. 2002
see also State v. -3- Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 599, (ineffectiveness claims should be brought in Rule 32 proceedings).
State v. Blackman 38 P.3d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Blackman 38 P.3d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Bass 31 P.3d 857 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Bass 31 P.3d 857 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Harrod 26 P.3d 492 Ariz. 2001
State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
¶ 25 Recognizing that shortcoming in his argument, , suggests that we require a Biggers analysis even absent an allegation that state action tainted an identification.