Cited by

(“Defense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

This is because “[d]efense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.”

rather than self-defense”); ¶ 12 (2021) (“[M]atters of trial strategy and tactics are committed to defense counsel’s judgment and generally cannot serve as the basis for an IAC claim.”) (cleaned up); (“Defense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

On the contrary, his counsel stated, “I’m fine at this point just pointing them towards separate counts.” But the “[d]efendant cannot take his chances on a favorable verdict, reserving the ‘hole card’ of a later appeal on an evidentiary matter that was curable at trial, and then seek appellate reversal from an unfavorable verdict.” –14 (1989).

The law does not guarantee “perfect counsel, only competent counsel.” -67 (1995).

No. MH 2008- 002659, (disapproving “defendant from ‘tak[ing] his chances on a favorable verdict, reserving the ‘hole card’ of a later appeal on [a] matter that was curable at trial, and then seek[ing] appellate reversal” (alterations in Henderson) (-14 (1989))).

at 150–52, ¶¶ 50–57; ¶ 19 (2005) (“burden of persuasion” shifts to a defendant in fundamental-error review to discourage him “from ‘tak[ing] his chances on a favorable verdict, reserving the “hole card” of a later appeal on [a] matter that was curable at trial, and then seek[ing] appellate reversal.’” (alterations in original) (–14 (1989), –67 (1995))); (trial court not required to determine the voluntariness of confession sua sponte).

See, (noting that “in cases where there has been misconduct of either the prosecutor or defense counsel, but reversal is not required, the proper remedy will be affirmance, followed by institution of bar disciplinary proceedings against the off

A criminal defendant does not have the right to “perfect counsel, only competent counsel,” and ineffectiveness must be “a demonstrable reality rather than a matter of speculation,” (citation omitted).

“Defense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.”

¶ 114 (2018) (finding that the “brevity and inconsequential nature” of the erroneous reference to defendant’s identity did not constitute fundamental error); (concluding no fundamental error when prosecutor’s improper closing argument reference to defendant seeking a plea agreement was “an isolated evidentiary matter”).

Accordingly, our supreme court has stated that, given Rule 17.4, it does “not endorse any mention of plea bargains in final 4 STATE v. EATON Decision of the Court arguments.” n.2 (1989), -67 (1995).

See Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9; (rejecting defendant’s IAC claim on direct appeal).

¶9 “Defendants are not guaranteed perfect counsel, only competent counsel.” –67 (1995).

2 STATE v. FALKENBURRY Decision of the Court ¶4 “Defendants are not guaranteed perfect counsel, only competent counsel.” –67, –52 (1995).

-15 (1989) (“Defense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.

“[D]eterminations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.” -15, -19 (1989) (citations omitted), -67, -52 (1995).

“Defense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citations omitted), -67, -52 (1995).

Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 26 , 115 P.3d at 608 ; see also id, at 567, ¶ 19, (-14 , -18 (1989) (explaining that under fundamental error review, we place the burden to prove prejudice on the defendant, “to discourage a defendant from ‘tak[ing] his chances on a favorable verdict, reserving the ‘hole card’ of a later appeal on [a] matter that was curable at trial, and then seek

“Defense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Further, “[d]efense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful, are not ineffective assistance of counsel.” -15, -19 (1989) (citations omitted).