Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Jimenez, 799 P.2d 785.

66 citing documents.

State v. Jimenez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Jimenez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Baltierrez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
State v. Baltierrez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
.”); (explaining that a juvenile Miranda rights form “contained the same listing of constitutional rights [as that of a standard rights card] along with explanations geared to a juvenile’s understanding” and included additional considerations relevant to juvenile interviews such as advising that a juvenile may
State v. Valenzuela Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Valenzuela Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Ntiamoah Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Ntiamoah Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Carrillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Carrillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State of Arizona v. Trent Christopher Benson 307 P.3d 19 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Trent Christopher Benson 307 P.3d 19 Ariz. 2013
(holding “repetitive gripping” of ligature and other indications of a struggle evidenced especial cruelty), with Snelling, 225 Ariz. at 189 ¶¶ 31-32, 236 P.3d at 416 (finding no mental anguish when no evidence of a struggle, and “only a single ligature mark”), (finding no especial cruelty when victim strangled “quickly and by surprise and she rapidly lost consciousness”).
State v. Snelling 236 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2010
State v. Snelling 236 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2010
And, unlike the victim in State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 454, she was in her own house and 13 did not know her attacker.
State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
(numerous post- mortem stab wounds indicated needless mutilation).
State of Arizona v. John William Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State of Arizona v. John William Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
P., 16A A.R.S., once a defendant has “establish[ed] a prima facie case that the evidence taken should be suppressed,” the state then has “the burden of proving, by a prepon derance o f the evide nce, the law fulness in a ll respects of the acq uisition o f all evid ence” -49, -90 (1990) (to rebut presumption that confessions resulting from custodial interrogation are inherently involuntary, “the state mus t sho w by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was free ly and volunta rily
In Re Andre M. 88 P.3d 552 Ariz. 2004
In Re Andre M. 88 P.3d 552 Ariz. 2004
A defendant may waive his Miranda rights, “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; (“To be voluntary, a confession must not only be free from coercion, but the defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights must be knowing and intelligent.”).
State v. Huerstel 75 P.3d 698 Ariz. 2003
State v. Huerstel 75 P.3d 698 Ariz. 2003
¶50 “We start with the presumption that confessions resulting from custodial interrogation are inherently involuntary; to rebut that presumption, the state must show by a preponderance of the evidence the confession was freely and voluntarily made.” State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 448-49, -90 (1990) (citations omitted).
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
but a major contributing cause of [the defendant’s] conduct that was ‘sufficiently substantial’ to outweigh the aggravating factors present ....’”) ( , (when voices told defendant to kill he could not control what he was doing) (emphasis added)), ce rt.
State v. Clabourne 983 P.2d 748 Ariz. 1999
State v. Clabourne 983 P.2d 748 Ariz. 1999
” , (when voices told defendant to kill he could not control what he was doing) (emphasis added); , 608 n. 12, , 892 n. 12 (1993) (“[E]videnee of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating fa
State v. Medina 975 P.2d 94 Ariz. 1999
State v. Medina 975 P.2d 94 Ariz. 1999
In Re Timothy C. 978 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
In Re Timothy C. 978 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
-49 , -90 (1990); Navajo County Juv.
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
this court decided that the defendant’s age, seventeen years and two months, was not, in itself, of such substantial weight as to require leniency when balanced against two aggravating factors.
State v. Doody 930 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Doody 930 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Bolton 896 P.2d 830 Ariz. 1995
State v. Bolton 896 P.2d 830 Ariz. 1995
State v. Richmond 886 P.2d 1329 Ariz. 1994
State v. Richmond 886 P.2d 1329 Ariz. 1994
Although the body here was disfigured, we agree with the concurring justices in Richmond II that “mutilation” requires an “indication of a separate purpose to mutilate the corpse.” Richmond II, 136 Ariz. at 323 , 666 P.2d at 68 ; , (numerous post-mortem stab wounds indicated needless mutilation and use of gratuitous violence); , (defendant’s carving of word “Bonzai” in victim’s back after killing him supported finding of depravity).
State v. Wood 881 P.2d 1158 Ariz. 1994
State v. Wood 881 P.2d 1158 Ariz. 1994
Cf, -62 , -800 (1990) (defendant suffered from psychotic illness, experienced hallucinations, and heard voices); Rossi, 154 Ariz. at 249-51 , 741 P.2d at 1227-29 (defendant suffered from cocaine intoxication with delusions and hallucinations).
State v. Gallegos 870 P.2d 1097 Ariz. 1994
State v. Gallegos 870 P.2d 1097 Ariz. 1994
(victim’s age considered in finding both (F)(6) and (F)(9) aggravating factors).
State v. Milke 865 P.2d 779 Ariz. 1993
State v. Milke 865 P.2d 779 Ariz. 1993
(defendant “murdered a helpless [five-year-old] child who trusted him”).
State v. Stuard 863 P.2d 881 Ariz. 1993
State v. Stuard 863 P.2d 881 Ariz. 1993
See, -60 , -01 (1990); Mauro, 159 Ariz. at 207-08 , 766 P.2d at 80-81
State v. Henry 863 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1993
State v. Henry 863 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1993