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¶43 With no Doyle due process violation in this case, “this issue becomes one of state evidentiary law.”

See, STATE v. MELENDEZ Opinion of the Court 580 (1993).

-69 (1982); (concluding evidence introduced on redirect examination of victim was within the scope of cross-examination, given the defendant’s cross-examination attack on purported inconsistencies in the victim’s direct testimony), 7 STATE v. HARRELL Decision of the Court (holding a defendant was not entitled to recross-examination when redirect examination raised “nothing new”).

See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21 (requiring courts to consider 5 STATE v. HORAK Decision of the Court the entire record in determining whether an error is fundamental); (“[T]he state should not have elicited the [challenged] testimony in its case-in-chief.

A. Advisory Counsel ¶12 When a defendant in custody exercises the right of self- representation, “the Fifth Amendment guarantee of access to the courts requires that he or she be provided an adequate law library or assistance from someone trained in the law.” (“Because defendants were provided with either advisory counsel or counsel throughout their proceedings, their constitutional right to court access was met, regardless of whether they had personal access to legal materials.”).

(finding no constitutional violation when the defendant’s “vigorous defense” caused delays despite his personal opposition to continuances).

(finding no constitutional violation when the defendant’s “vigorous defense” caused delays “of his own making” despite his personal opposition to continuances).

See, e.g., Parker, 231 Ariz. at 399 ¶ 15 (weighing a delay of seeking his right two years and nine months after his arrest against the defendant); (fourteen-month delay in asserting right weighed against defendant).

“There is a strong presumption of effective assistance.” STATE v. GETZEN Decision of the Court 585 (1993).

But a defendant who represents himself does not have a right to his “preferred means of access.”

¶ 7 (citing State v. Wall , , ¶ 15, , 150-51 (2006) (theft lesser-included offense of robbery); State v. Henry , , 582, , 874 (1993) (robbery lesser-included offense of armed robbery); State v. Kinkade , , 253, , 887 (1985) (theft lesser-included offense of armed robbery) ).

VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24

See, ¶ 62, ¶ 56, Dann, 220 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 10, 207 P.3d at 611; ¶ 44, State v. Henry (Henry II), State v. Henry (Henry I)

Accordingly, a prosecutor may comment on statements a Mirandized defendant has made to arresting officers without “commenting on the accused’s right to remain silent.” (“When a defendant is not induced into silence by Miranda warnings, [] or waives his rights by answering questions after such warnings are given, due process is not implicated.”).

(“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’”) (quoting United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Blevins, 555 F.2d 1236, 1240 (5th Cir. 1977))); (after nine days of testimony, single reference during closing argument to defendant being a psychopath “did not influence the verdict and was not so egregious as to deny [defendant] a

Here, however, the analysis is somewhat different because the Arizona Supreme Court has held that: (1) robbery is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery, (2) theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery, –4 ¶ 15, –51 (2006); S

A defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) counsel lacked minimal competence as determined by prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”

See, (fourteen-month delay 6 in asserting right weighed against defendant); Phan v. State, 723 S.E.2d 876, 883 (Ga.