DocketDrift

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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Henry, 863 P.2d 861.

95 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Scott Alan Colvin 293 P.3d 545 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
    (citing California case law to show physical violence not required under California’s involuntary manslaughter statute, in contrast to analogous Arizona statute).
  • State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
    at 551, 944 P.2d at 66; State v. Henry (Henry I), -75, -67 (1993).
  • State v. McCray 183 P.3d 503 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. McCray 183 P.3d 503 Ariz. 2008
  • State of Arizona v. Ramon Anthony Joyner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
  • State of Arizona v. Ramon Anthony Joyner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
    ¶ 8, citing Roque, ¶¶ 82-88, 141 P.3d at 391-92 (California robbery was “serious offense” under § 13-703(F)(2)); (California involuntary manslaughter not crime of violence under former § 13-703(F)(2)); (Nevada attempted murder not violent crime under former § 13-703(F)(2)).
  • State v. Crawford 149 P.3d 753 Ariz. 2007
  • State v. Crawford 149 P.3d 753 Ariz. 2007
    (reviewing California involuntary manslaughter statute to determine if a statutory element of that crime involved violence in order to 5 determine whether the California conviction was an aggravating circumstance under previous version of A
  • State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
    § 13-703(F)(2).” 8 To protect “a criminal defendant’s due process rights,” a court “may not consider other evidence[] or bring in witnesses” to establish 7 Section 13-703(H) was renumbered as § 13-703(I) in 2005.
  • State v. Chiappetta 107 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • State v. Chiappetta 107 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
    (finding robbery instruction that defendant “threatened or used force with the intent either to coerce the surrender of the property or to prevent resistance to his taking or retaining the property” adequately informed the jurors of the co-existence requirement and provided an adequate
  • State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
    see also LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 27 , 734 P.2d at 569 .
  • State v. Harrod 26 P.3d 492 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Harrod 26 P.3d 492 Ariz. 2001
    Cf. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 27 , 734 P.2d at 569 ; , (declarant was legally unavailable because of showing that declarant would have asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege if called to testify); State v. Thoma, 313 Or.
  • State v. Carlos 17 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • State v. Carlos 17 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
    Rather, the precluded witness had been either an accomplice who was tried separately, , or a person whom the defendant claimed was the actual perpetrator of the crime.
  • State v. Anderson 4 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Anderson 4 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2000
    -77 , -69 (1993) (evidence of unlikelihood of scenario proffered by defendant, coupled with finding victim’s wallet near the murder scene and evidence that defendant drove the victim’s truck away immediately after the murder, supports robbeiy charge).
  • State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
    See Richmond, 180 Ariz. at 578, 886 P.2d at 1334 ( , and its holding that “[t]he statutory definition of the prior crime and not its specific factual basis, dictates whether an aggravating circumstance exists under A.R.S.
  • State v. Vasko 971 P.2d 189 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Vasko 971 P.2d 189 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    Similarly, in Spreitz , our supreme court observed: The Rule 8 right to a speedy trial is not fundamental, but “a procedural right, ‘not a shield by which the accused may avoid trial and possible punishment by taking advantage of loopholes in the law or arithmetic errors.’ ” 190 Ariz. at 139 , 945 P.2d at 1270
  • State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
    (12- and 36-hour gaps between interrogations).
  • State v. Schackart 947 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Schackart 947 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1997
    § 13-703(H)(2); Richmond, 180 Ariz. at 579 , 886 P.2d at 1335 (kidnapping); State v. Hen *248 ry, , (manslaughter); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 604 , 858 P.2d at 1207 (sexual assault).
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
    We have earlier decided that the Rule 8 right to a speedy trial is not fundamental, but “a procedural right, ‘not a shield by which the accused may avoid trial and possible punishment by taking advantage of loopholes in the law or arithmetic errors.’” , (quoting Guerrero, 159 Ariz. at 570 , 769 P.2d at 1016 ).
  • State v. Henry 944 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Henry 944 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Nieto 924 P.2d 453 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Nieto 924 P.2d 453 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Roscoe 910 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Roscoe 910 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
    Walton, 159 Ariz. at 584 , 769 P.2d at 1030 .
  • State v. Murray 906 P.2d 542 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Murray 906 P.2d 542 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Richmond 886 P.2d 1329 Ariz. 1994
  • State v. Richmond 886 P.2d 1329 Ariz. 1994
  • State v. Maldonado 889 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Maldonado 889 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994