Cited by

..” It is an error for a court to allow a party to “make arguments which appeal to the passions and fears of the jury.” ¶ 149 (2004).

burden merely by showing that a prospective juror had previously been a crime victim, ¶ 126 (2019), that the prospective juror’s “assurances of impartiality” were not “couched in absolute terms,” ¶ 37 (2000), or even that the prospective juror has “preconceived notions concerning the defendant’s guilt[,]”

§ 13-752(R) (allowing victim to present information during penalty phase 13 Strong also states the “satanic” statement violated the “mandate”

(“In light of the overwhelming evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt, it is evident that the prosecutor’s comments did not contribute to the verdict.”).

Prosecutors are given “wide latitude” in their closing arguments but cannot make arguments that “appeal to the passions and fears of the jury.”

(“A juror with preconceived notions may be rehabilitated during voir dire if an ability and willingness to be impartial is demonstrated.”).

¶95 “Prosecutors are given ’wide latitude‘ in presenting closing argument to the jury.” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 466 ¶ 196 ().

Although “[p]rosecutors are given ‘wide latitude’ in presenting closing argument to the jury,” ¶ 196 (2016) (), their prerogative to argue their version of the evidence does not sanction a misstatement of law

¶8 Prosecutors “are given wide latitude in their closing arguments to the jury.” ().

In Morris, for the well-settled proposition that a prosecutor “cannot make arguments that appeal to the fears or passions of the jury.” 215 Ariz. at 337 ¶ 58.

–27 (1990) (concluding the prosecutor’s descriptions of the defendant as a “monster” and “filth” “exceeded the bounds of appropriate closing argument” and constituted misconduct); ¶ 54 (2003) (explaining a prosecutor should refrain from expressing any personal belief ab

¶165 “Attorneys, including prosecutors in criminal cases, are given wide latitude in their closing arguments to the jury.”

“Although we stated in Lopez, ‘[w]hen the use of force and the taking of property are not contemporaneous, there may be a theft, but there is not a robbery,’ we did not intend to suggest that when a person uses force with the intent to take another’s property he has not committed robbery.” (alteration in original) ().

¶29 Although "[a]ttorneys, including prosecutors in criminal cases, are given wide latitude in their closing arguments," State v. Moody , , ¶ 154, (quoting State v. Comer , , 426, , 346 (1990) ), there are limitations.

(considering overwhelming evidence of guilt to render prosecutor’s comments harmless).

("We have permitted joinder of offenses in a single trial where the offenses arose out of a series of connected acts, and the offenses were provable by much the same evidence.").

¶23 In criminal cases, counsel is given “wide latitude” in closing argument, and may “comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.”